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The Effects of Non-Trading on the Illiquidity Ratio 
Patricia Chelley-Steeley, Neophytos Lambertides and James Steeley 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Using a simulation analysis we show that non-trading can cause an overstatement of the 
observed illiquidity ratio. Our paper shows how this overstatement can be eliminated with a very 
simple adjustment to the Amihud illiquidity ratio. We find that the adjustment improves the 
relationship between the illiquidity ratio and measures of illiquidity calculated from transactions 
data. Asset pricing tests show that without the adjustment, illiquidity premia estimates can be 
understated by more than 17% for NYSE securities and by more than 24% for NASDAQ 
securities. 
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1. Introduction 
Amihud (2002) provides a compelling motivation for the use of an illiquidity ratio, specifically 
the annual average of the ratio of daily absolute return to daily dollar volume, in asset pricing 
tests. Having been scrutinized within a range of empirical frameworks, there is now a wealth of 
support for the existence of a premium associated with the illiquidity ratio. Moreover, the use of 
the Amihud illiquidity ratio has become a commonly used measure of illiquidity in a wide range 
of finance applications and settings. 
Evidence of its widespread use as a measure of illiquidity is also evident by entering the 
phrase “Amihud Illiquidity Ratio” in the Google search engine which renders over 7,000 
responses1. Moreover, scrutiny of Science-Direct, the archive for Elsevier publications, indicates 
that between its publication date and November 2013 over three hundred and eighty finance 
papers have been published on this database alone utilising the Amihud illiquidity ratio. Despite 
its widespread use there has been virtually no attention placed on the empirical properties of the 
illiquidity ratio.  
In this paper we show that the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio is a biased measure of the 
true illiquidity ratio when the measurement period includes days during which securities do not 
trade. We then develop an adjustment for the observed illiquidity ratio that reduces the effects of 
non-trading days2. The measurement problem arises because the illiquidity ratio is the annual 
average of the daily ratio of absolute return to dollar volume. Mathematical software that is used 
to calculate the illiquidity ratio cannot divide by zero, so treats days of zero volume as missing 
values. Therefore, the ratio is calculated by averaging over only those days with non-zero 
volume. We show how the elimination of non-trading days, which is necessary to avoid divisions 
                                                          
1
 This exercise was undertaken in November 2013.  
2
 Non-trading days are those days on which markets are open for trading but there is zero volume for individual 
securities.  
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by zero, can distort the computation of the illiquidity ratio. We propose a simple and effective 
remedy.  
Using simulation analysis, we show that non-trading has two opposing affects on the 
measured illiquidity ratio. The impact on the properties of absolute returns serves to decrease the 
illiquidity ratio, while the elimination of zero volume days acts to increase the ratio. The net 
effect overall is an upward bias in the ratio.  We find that even when there is a small to moderate 
amount of thin trading, the magnitude of this upward bias in the measurement of illiquidity is 
substantial. This allows security illiquidity to be miscalibrated, potentially misrepresenting the 
relationship between illiquidity and other financial variables. Moreover, a bias in illiquidity 
measurement can potentially give rise to inaccurate rankings when securities are stratified into 
groups or portfolios on the basis of illiquidity or variables, such as size, that tend to be highly 
correlated with illiquidity.  
We propose an adjustment to the illiquidity ratio, which scales back the upward bias 
arising from non-trading. This adjustment is derived from the two opposing effects that non-
trading has on the calculation of the ratio, and involves scaling the Amihud illiquidity ratio by a 
factor composed of the number of possible trading days, over which the ratio is being measured, 
and the number of days that the stock actually traded within those days. We show that for 
securities that experience some thin trading, but are not characterized by extreme thin trading 
(thin trading probabilities above 70%) our proposed measure eradicates most of the potential 
measurement bias. When thin trading probabilities rise above 70% our proposed measure does 
not fully eliminate the bias in the unadjusted illiquidity ratio. But even at thin trading levels this 
high, the bias in our preferred measure is still one third to one fifth lower than that associated 
with the un-scaled measure.  
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We use NYSE TAQ data over the period 1993 to 2008 to estimate the Kyle (1985) price 
impact measure and the fixed-cost component of the bid-ask spread using the method of Glosten 
and Harris (1988) and show that the adjustment that we propose enhances the relationship 
between the Amihud ratio and measures of illiquidity obtained from transactions data. Using 
CRSP monthly return data for NYSE/AMEX securities between 1960 and 2008 and NASDAQ 
securities listed 1983-2008, we show that measurement bias in the illiquidity ratio is also 
important for the estimation of the illiquidity premium. We undertake cross-section Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) asset pricing tests. Our model specifications examine in turn the scaled and un-
scaled illiquidity ratios.3 These tests reveal that the illiquidity premium associated with each of 
our computed illiquidity ratios is significant, while differences between the time-series averages 
of the illiquidity measures show that omitting zero volume days reduces the illiquidity premium 
significantly.  
Although the magnitude of this potential understatement of the illiquidity premium varies 
according to the cross-section specification and the market being studied, the effects of omitting 
zero volume days are not inconsequential. We find that omitting these days leads to an 
understatement in the illiquidity premium that is over 17% for NYSE/AMEX stocks and over 
24% for NASDAQ stocks. This discovery is of particular importance for investors that make 
long term portfolio allocation decisions that aim to exploit the illiquidity premium. The results 
we report are robust to the influence of market beta, firm size, the Fama and French (1993) 
HML, SMB and momentum (Mom) factors, the systematic illiquidity risk factor proposed by 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and a range of firm characteristics. 
                                                          
3
 The cross section variation in the scaling, which is different for each security as it reflects the extent of non-trading for each 
security, means that this comparison is not a purely mechanical exercise. The impact of the non-trading adjustment on estimated 
illiquidity premia is an empirical question. This point is discussed in more depth in Section 3.1. 
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The relevance of our results is not exclusive to the Amihud-illiquidity ratio but also 
extends to related measures of illiquidity/liquidity such as the Amivest liquidity ratio, which is 
the average of the ratio of daily volume to daily absolute return. This ratio has been applied 
previously by, for example, Cooper, Groth and Avera (1985), Amihud, Mendelson and 
Lauterbach (1997), Berkman and Elsewarapu (1998), Pagano and Schwartz (2003), Chelley-
Steeley (2015) and Chelley-Steeley et al (2015) to measure liquidity. A measurement bias may 
exist also for the Amivest ratio, which would need to exclude cases of zero returns since the ratio 
of volume to absolute return will be undefined on these days.4 
 Although our results have important implications for NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ 
stocks, they will apply to any market that has some securities that are thinly traded. In many 
European or emerging stock markets thin trading levels are much higher than those usually 
associated with the US5. Moreover, use of the illiquidity ratio is not and need not be limited to 
stock markets.6 Adapting the illiquidity ratio for thin trading bias will also be important for the 
study of illiquidity in the context of other less active asset markets.  
The Amihud illiquidity ratio has been used in a wide range of applications which can be 
broadly decomposed into the following categories, asset pricing, event analysis of illiquidity, 
rankings and the intertemporal analysis of illiquidity. Asset pricing tests that examine the risk 
premium to the illiquidity ratio (see for example Amihud 2002, Chan et al (2008) or 
Asparouhova et al (2010)) understate the true illiquidity premium when assets are thinly traded 
causing investors to be less able to make optimal asset allocation decisions. The effect of this 
                                                          
4
 Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2007) have shown how the information in zero 
returns per se may be harnessed as a measure of illiquidity.  
5
 For example, Lim, Habibullah and Hinich (2009) study thin trading effects in the Shenzen and Shanghai markets in China, 
while Antoniou and Holmes (1997) discuss thin trading patterns in emerging markets.  
6
 For example, Dick-Nielsen et al (2012) examine a range of liquid and illiquid corporate bonds around the onset of the subprime 
crisis. 
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understatement may cause underinvestment in stocks characterised by thin trading because 
overall risk premiums will appear supressed. 
 A range of studies have examined how the Amihud illiquidity changes in response to an 
exogenous shock (see Henke and Lauterbach (2005), Becker-Blease and Paul (2006),  and 
Chelley-Steeley (2008))7. When such events alter not only the true illiquidity ratio but also 
change the amount of non-trading, the effect of the event on the observed illiquidity ratio will be 
overstated. This happens because a reduction in post-event thin trading reduces the bias. This 
will be most acute when exogenous shocks also influence the cost of trading because as noted by 
Lesmond et al (1999) lower trading costs will incentivise trading activity and reduce non-trading 
days. Use of the adjusted illiquidity ratio we propose will mitigate this problem.  
The correct ranking of securities on the basis of the illiquidity ratio will also be corrupted 
as the thin trading bias we have discovered causes some securities to appear more illiquid than 
they really are. Moreover, during periods when markets are under stress and non-trading is likely 
to be higher the adjusted measure will project a more accurate measure of illiquidity during these 
periods.  
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the simulation analysis. This 
section shows how non-trades bias the measurement of the illiquidity ratio and documents the 
relationship between the magnitude of the bias and the degree of thin trading. This section 
concludes by proposing an adjustment to the illiquidity ratio that reduces most of the bias 
associated with thin trading levels documented for US securities. Section 3 describes the data we 
have used in this study and the empirical methodology we utilize. In Section 4 we report our 
empirical results. We provide summary statistical analysis of the illiquidity ratio for US stocks, 
                                                          
7
 Henke and Lauterbach (2005) and Chelley-Steeley (2008) use the illiquidity ratio to show that changing the trading mechanism 
leads to an increase in liquidity,  Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) use the illiquidity ratio to examine the impact that index addition 
has on the investment opportunities of firms with different levels of illiquidity while Gaspar and Massa (2007) use the illiquidity 
ratio to show that ownership structure influences security illiquidity. 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 7
the results of the examination of the relationship between our proposed adjustment and 
transactions level measures of illiquidity and the results of the Fama and MacBeth asset pricing 
tests. Our empirical results end with robustness tests using sub-samples of data and the square 
root transformation of the illiquidity ratio introduced by Hasbrouck (2009). Section 5 provides a 
summary of the main findings of the paper and offers some conclusions.  
2. Non-trading and the illiquidity ratio: A simulation analysis 
In this section, we consider the influence of thin trading on the measurement of security 
illiquidity using a simulation analysis.   The Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio for a single stock is 
the annual average of the ratio of daily absolute return to daily dollar volume. Specifically, for 
stock i in year y, the illiquidity ratio, yi ,ILLIQ , is calculated as 
ILLIQ, =
1,
,,,,
,

 
  (1) 
 
where , is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in year y, ,,  is the 
absolute return of stock i on day t of year y. ,, is the dollar volume for stock i on  day t of year 
y.  
For a given volume, the bigger the price impact measured by the absolute return, the 
more illiquid is the stock and the larger is the illiquidity measure. Similarly, for a given absolute 
return, lower volume stocks will register as being more illiquid. Difficulties may arise in the 
application of this measure where securities do not trade every day. On a day of zero volume, the 
ratio would be mathematically undefined. In the calculation of this ratio, most statistical 
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packages will replace an instance of division by zero with a missing value. This has the effect of 
changing the calculation of the illiquidity ratio to 
ILLIQ, =
1, − ,
,,,,
,,

 
(2) 
where τi,y is the number of non-trading days by stock i in year y, and , < ,.8 Other terms are 
as previously defined. In the presence of non-trading days, there will therefore be fewer 
observations used to calculate the average daily ratio. 
However, in the presence of non-trading days, the illiquidity ratio is affected in ways 
other than just by the reduction in the number of observations that can be directly seen in 
equation (2). Models of non-synchronous trading, such as those of Scholes and Williams (1978) 
and Lo and MacKinlay (1990), show that the moment properties of observed returns change 
when, following periods of non-trading, observed returns are the accumulation of a sequence of 
underlying unobserved returns. Our simulations show that observed absolute returns, which 
make up the numerator of the illiquidity ratio, are reduced by the effects of non-trading. By 
itself, the effect on observed absolute returns would make stocks appear more liquid than they 
really are. However, we show also that the representation of non-trading days by missing values 
(just the change in the number of observations, in isolation of other effects) generates an increase 
in the illiquidity ratio. This increase in the illiquidity ratio, arising from omitting zero volume 
days, could potentially offset the decrease in the ratio, arising from the effect on observed 
absolute returns. The key result from our simulation analysis is that this increase in the illiquidity 
ratio is relatively much larger, so that the combined effect on the illiquidity ratio leaves it 
overstating the illiquidity of stocks. This means that after zero volume days have been omitted, 
                                                          
8
 To simplify the summation notation in equation (2), it is assumed that the daily illiquidity ratios, within , have been sorted 
in decreasing order of volume. This does not affect the results of the summations.  
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an additional downward correction to the illiquidity ratio is required. Our simulations suggest 
what this adjustment should be. 
 
2.1 The Simulation Analysis 
We assume that daily unobservable (log) security returns, *tR , are normally distributed with an 
annualized mean excess return of 8 percent and standard deviation of 20 percent.9 The series of 
unobservable returns is converted into a price series, through 
∗ = expln∗ 	+ ∗	 (3) 
 
To simulate non-trading, we follow the method adopted by Dimson (1979). We take 
100,000 independent drawings, Ut from a uniform distribution on the range 0 − 1. For a non-
trading probability, p, if the uniformly distributed variate for period t is less than or equal to this 
probability value, trading does not occur in period t and if the variate is greater than the 
probability value then trading does take place in period t.10 If we define a trade indicator variable 
as 	, = 0 (if 
 ≤ ; no trade) or 	, = 1 (if 
 > ; trade), then “observed” prices are 
generated by  
	, = 	, + 	,∗ − 	, (4) 
 
                                                          
9
 We examined the robustness of the simulation analysis to wide variations in the parameters of the unobservable returns series. 
Wide ranging pparameter variation induced less than a 1/10th of 1 percent change in the induced bias in the illiquidity ratio at 
non-trading probabilities less than 27 percent, and less than a 1 percent change at probabilities up to 93 percent. All these 
additional results are in a supplementary document available on request to the authors. 
 
10
 At this stage, we are assuming, therefore, that non-trading arises randomly. Although informed traders may engage in forms of 
endogenous non-trading, the presence of liquidity traders with exogenous trading motives, is consistent with random occurrences 
of zero volume. In the next section, we extend our model to allow for the possibility of an association between volume and price 
changes. We also repeated the simulation exercise introducing a simple time dependency into the daily non-trading probabilities. 
Time dependency increased the bias in the illiquidity ratio, but this was barely detectable at non-trading probabilities less than 50 
percent. These additional results are in a supplementary document available on request to the authors. 
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Thus, if trading does not take place, then 	, = 	, and the “observed” return will be zero. If 
trading does occur, then 	, = ∗, and the “observed” return, 	,, is calculated as 
	, = ln	, 	,⁄  (5) 
 
so “observed” returns represent the accumulation of any “unobserved” returns since the last 
“observed” return.  
For each of the one hundred percentile non-trading probabilities, between zero and 99 
inclusive, that is, (p=0,1,2,…,99), we use the series of 100,000 unobserved prices, from equation 
(3) and the no-trade generator in (4) to create 100 observable returns series, each of 100,000 
observations. Each series has a different incidence of non-trading days,           ≈  × 10
, but 
each has the same underlying parameters determining the unobservable returns.11 The first 
“observed” returns series with the zero non-trading probability, (p=0) is the original series of 
unobserved returns, undisturbed by non-trading. The second “observed” returns series has a non-
trading probability of 1 percent, the third series a probability of 2 percent, and so on. The one 
hundredth series has a probability of non-trading of 99 percent. 
To concentrate our focus on where within the illiquidity ratio information is lost as a 
result of zero volume days, we model the volume series as a simple binary process. If there is no 
trading, dollar volume is zero, and if there is trading, dollar volume is unity. This assumption 
permits a key simplification to the illiquidity ratio, that both exposes the affects of non-trading 
and ultimately suggests a remedy. 12  
                                                          
11
 The only parameter that is changed between one non-trading probability percentage point and the next is the non-trading 
probability itself. The unobserved returns and prices series are common to each probability, as is the uniform distribution used in 
the no-trade generator. As the number of observations, n, increases,  →  × . 
12
 We examined the robustness of our simulation analysis to more general returns and volume processes. We introduced the 
possibility that returns could be non-zero even if volume is zero, and also introduced low and high levels of non-zero volume, 
together with differing levels of price adjustment. While these generalizations did impact the bias in the illiquidity ratio, none 
were of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the dominant influence of the change to absolute returns that happens when observed 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 11 
As the no-trade generator produces a volume series with the property that 	, = 0, if 
	, = 0, and 	, > 0, if 	, = 1, the formula for the illiquidity ratio, equation (2), can be 
simplified to 
ILLIQ =
1 −  	,


 
(6) 
 
in which case the illiquidity ratio is equal to the mean absolute return, calculated over trading 
days. The year and security identifying subscripts have been suppressed to simplify the notation. 
For each of the 100 series of 100,000 simulated observable returns, we calculate the 
illiquidity ratio, equation (6), using , =  = 200, which gives 500 simulated “years” to 
calculate the illiquidity ratio of the stock, for the non-trading probability corresponding to the 
particular observable returns series. For each non-trading probability, the 500 annual values for 
the stock are averaged to give an “observed” measurement of the illiquidity ratio.13 We then 
normalize the illiquidity ratio from each observed return series, (p=0,1,2,…,99), by dividing it by 
the illiquidity ratio of unobserved returns, (p=0), to expose the impact on the ratio of increasing 
levels of thin trading. 14 Figure 1 shows the normalized illiquidity ratios plotted against the 
probability of non-trading. It can be seen that the illiquidity ratio for observed returns diverges 
increasingly from the ratio for unobserved returns (p=0) as the incidence of non-trading 
increases.  
[Figure 1] 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
returns are the accumulation of unobserved returns following periods of non-trading. These additional results are available in a 
supplementary document available from the authors.  
13
 Since the unobservable returns are independent drawings by construction, the average of the 500 annual illiquidity ratios is the 
same as the average of all individual 100,000 daily ratios. 
14
 The illiquidity ratio for unobserved returns (the case of no zero volume days) can also be calculated directly from the initial 
parameter settings (mean and variance) for the unobserved returns, without the need for simulation, by using the properties of the 
absolute values of normal variates, see Leone et al (1961). The ratio calculated from the 100,000 simulated “unobserved” returns 
was within one tenth of one percent of the ratio calculated directly from the initial parameters of the unobserved returns series. 
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This simulation result indicates that to adjust the illiquidity ratio for non-trading, it is 
necessary to reduce its size. Since non-trading is itself a manifestation of illiquidity, it is 
tempting to expect that correcting the illiquidity ratio for the effects of non-trading, would 
require an increase in the illiquidity ratio. But this would be to imply that the illiquidity ratio can 
represent two forms of illiquidity, both the price impact of changes in dollar volume and non-
trading, when it is only designed to measure the former. Hence, we are seeking to adjust the 
illiquidity ratio for the potential information losses arising from the omission of zero volume 
days rather than construct a multidimensional measure of illiquidity. 
Nevertheless, we can demonstrate that the act of omitting zero volume days per se does 
indeed raise the illiquidity ratio, but that the information losses arising from this cause the ratio 
to increase too much, requiring a further downward adjustment to the illiquidity ratio. We do this 
by separating the two ways by which the illiquidity ratio for observed returns (with zero volume 
days) and unobserved returns (without zero volume days) are different.  
Differences between the mean absolute returns for observed and unobserved returns come 
from two sources, differences between observed and unobserved absolute returns and differences 
in the number of observations. To separate the impacts of each of these two differences, we can 
scale the simplified illiquidity ratio for observed returns in equation (6) by  − 	 ⁄  to give  
ILLIQ =
 − 	 ILLIQ 
													= 1 	,


 
 
(7) 
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This removes the influence of the change in the number of observations (induced by days 
of zero volume) and focuses on the impact on the illiquidity ratio of the difference between 
observed and unobserved absolute returns. The ratio ILLIQo is equivalent to computing the 
illiquidity ratio as in equation (6) but, rather than omitting zero volume days, introducing a zero-
valued observation on non-trading days. Figure 2 plots the ratio of ILLIQo to the illiquidity ratio 
for unobserved returns. It can be seen, therefore, that the information losses due to non-trading 
generate a reduction in absolute returns, and so the illiquidity ratio. Thus, the required correction 
to this downward bias is to increase the illiquidity ratio, back to the horizontal level, which 
corresponds to the ratio for unobserved returns. As shown in Figure 1, eliminating zero volume 
days does increase the illiquidity ratio, but by too much resulting in an illiquidity ratio that is 
greater than that for unobserved returns. Therefore, the illiquidity ratio, with zero volume days 
eliminated, needs to be adjusted back downwards to better reflect the information in the 
underlying unobserved returns series, which is lost through the effects of non-trading. 
[Figure 2] 
2.2 A non-trading adjustment for the Illiquidity Ratio  
A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 shows that the (net) downward adjustment required to 
the illiquidity ratio is approximately equal to the amount by which the ratio ILLIQo is itself 
biased downwards. That is, the upward bias in ILLIQ is roughly equal in magnitude and opposite 
in sign to the downward bias in ILLIQo. This points to a simple solution; use the average of the 
ratios ILLIQ and ILLIQo. 15 Combining equations (6) and (7) to create this average produces the 
adjusted illiquidity ratio, ILLIQ_A, 
                                                          
15
 We compared the reduction in bias from using the adjusted illiquidity measure in equation (8) to that obtained from using a 
wide variety of alternative uneven and non-linear weightings between ILLIQ and ILLIQ0. The evidence suggested that an equal-
weighted linear combination, as implied by ILLIQ_A, delivered an adjustment of similar benefit to the various alternative 
weighting schemes, but with by far the simplest design. These comparative results are also available in the supplementary 
document. 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 14 
 
 
 
 
ILLIQ = 	1 	,


+  1 −  	,


 2  
=
 − 	∑ 	, +  ∑ 	,
2 − 	 						 
= 2 − 
2   1 −  	,


											 
= 2 − 
2  ILLIQ																																					 
 
 
 
(8) 
   
The adjusted illiquidity ratio, in equation (8), is therefore a simple scaling on the 
conventionally applied illiquidity ratio, ILLIQ. This scaling uses the total number of trading 
days, T, and the number of zero volume days, τ, to reduce the over-adjustment of absolute returns 
that occurs by simply removing zero volume days from the calculation of the illiquidity ratio. 
Figure 3 shows a plot of the normalized adjusted ratio ILLIQ_A. It can be seen that the upward 
bias in the un-scaled ratio, ILLIQ, in Figure 1, for non-trading probabilities less than 70 percent, 
has been almost completely eliminated by applying the scaling in the adjusted ratio ILLIQ_A. 
[Figure 3] 
To summarize the potential improvement to the illiquidity ratio provided by the scaling 
factor in equation (8), we calculate the mean absolute percentage error (difference), across 
different ranges of non-trading probabilities, between the true illiquidity ratio and the observed 
illiquidity ratio, with and without the scaling factor. These error measures are reported in Table 
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1. The size of the errors for the scaled illiquidity ratio is less than one percent and at least an 
order of magnitude better than the un-scaled illiquidity ratio for all non-trading probabilities up 
to 50 percent.16 Above 50 percent non-trading probabilities, the scaled illiquidity ratio provides 
between a three- to five-fold improvement in the measure. 
[Table 1] 
While the simple simulation design facilitates the isolation of the effects of non-trading 
on the illiquidity ratio, it has done so by implicitly ignoring the possibility that trading, returns 
and volumes might be driven by the same common factors, in particular new information and 
investors' differences of opinion.17 Perhaps even more important is the possibility that the 
probability of trading is itself correlated with the path of 'theoretical returns'. This argument is 
provided by Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) who argue that investors trade only if the 
value of accumulated information exceeds the marginal cost of trading. If trading costs are 
substantial, new information must accumulate longer before investors engage in trading. One 
implication of Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) is that the probability of trading is greater 
when (absolute) 'theoretical returns' are higher. Since transaction costs reduce the eagerness of 
market participants in trading, only large changes in prices can reward investors from entering 
into new transactions, and the proposed adjustment may be discarding that aspect of market 
liquidity. 
To explicitly account for the possibility of an association between volatility and non-
trading, we modify the simulation as follows. The volume variable changes to 
 
                                                          
16
 When grouped by quintile, the range of non-trading probabilities for which the scaled illiquidity ratio represents an order of 
magnitude improvement extends to 60 percent. 
17
 Many empirical studies have analyzed the association between volumes and returns, including Karpoff (1987), Chordia and 
Swaminathan (2000) and Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) which report that stock returns are related to trading volume. 
Other studies document a positive association between expected future volatility and volumes (Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen, 
1992), and between volume and dispersion of beliefs (Ajinkya, Atiase, and Gift, 1991). 
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 = 0			if		|∗| ≤ ∗1			if		|∗| > ∗  (9) 
 
Where  is a constant of proportionality and ∗ is the standard deviation of the unobserved 
returns ∗. Thus, the security only trades if the current unobserved absolute return is greater than 
a threshold that is some multiple of the standard deviation away from the mean of the 
unobserved returns. We use a range of possible thresholds from zero to three standard deviations 
away from the mean. For the normally distributed simulated returns series, three standard 
deviations contain 99.7% of the distribution. The threshold represents the marginal cost of 
trading. In the simulations, we divide the range between zero and three standard deviations into 
100 increments. Within the parameterization of the simulation described earlier, each increment 
therefore corresponds to an increase in the costs of trading of approximately 0.038 percent. This 
modification to the simulation generates the relationship between the absolute return and the 
likelihood of trading that is shown in Figure 4.18 This figure shows that the higher is the 
threshold that the absolute return must exceed, to induce trading, the more likely is there to be 
non-trading. Using the simulated data, which now has non-trading days dependent upon absolute 
returns, we calculate again the observed illiquidity ratio, ILLIQ, and our adjusted ratio, 
ILLIQ_A. These are shown in Figure 5. Comparing Figure 5 to Figures 1 and 3, which display 
the corresponding illiquidity ratios for independently distributed non-trading days, we can see 
that the dependence introduced into non-trading increases the bias in ILLIQ. However, the 
ability of ILLIQ_A to reduce this bias is not noticeably altered.  
[Figure 4] 
                                                          
18
 The same set of simulation parameters was used to generate these dependent non-trading probabilities as was used to generate 
the unobserved returns used to compute the illiquidity ratios in Figures 1,2 and 3, so direct comparison can be made. 
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[Figure 5] 
 While the modification in equation (9) permits non-trading to be caused by low volatility, 
it does not include a mechanism to permit low volatility to arise following a period of non-
trading, and to persist at a lower level. To address this, we make two further adjustments to our 
simulations, to more closely represent the variety of empirical relations observed between 
volume and volatility, see for example Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen (1992). First, we allow for 
persistence in the volatility of returns, by introducing an ARCH(1) process into the conditional 
variance of unobserved returns.19 Second, we impose a drop in the absolute return immediately 
following a non-trading day, and this drop is reversed gradually over the subsequent 10 trading 
days, such that over a period of 10 days following a period of non-trading, the volatility returns 
to its pre-non-trading level. Specifically, the time dependent scaling factor   is applied to 
absolute unobserved returns, where  ≤ 10 is the number of days following a period of non-
trading, and 1 − 		is the proportional fall in absolute returns immediately following the 
period of non-trading. The scaling factor operates like a reverse partial adjustment mechanism, 
specifically  =  +  − , where  is an adjustment coefficient and  = 1. 
Following a drop in the magnitude of the returns of size 1 − 	, the return magnitude 
adjustment reverts back to 1, over a period of 10 days by following a convex increasing path. 
Initially, the reversion from the initial drop in volatility is slow, to build in persistence, but it 
speeds up as the end of the 10 day window is approached.20 The interaction of the ARCH process 
with the scaling factor allows yet further persistence to the drop in volatility following non-
trading. We calibrate the value of  from the returns data set that we use for our empirical 
                                                          
19
 In the supplementary document, we report the simulation results for a wide range of values for the ARCH coefficient. The 
results that we report here use a coefficient value of 0.90. This value generated the greatest excess kurtosis in the unobserved 
returns and the greatest autocorrelation in the squared unobserved returns. This value implies a half-life of shocks to the variance 
of around 7 trading days. 
20
 Amihud and Mendelson (1987) pioneered the use of a partial adjustment mechanism to model the adjustment of stock prices. 
The supplementary document contains an example of the adjustment process path for volatility. 
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analysis.21 Using both a 10 day window and a 4 day window either side of periods of non-
trading, we compute the average absolute returns (across firms and days) for each window. We 
then calculate the percentage change in absolute returns from before to after periods of non-
trading. We do this exercise on a year by year basis, as the illiquidity ratio is calculated 
empirically on a yearly basis. We use differing window lengths to mitigate measurement error 
from closely proximate periods of non-trading.22 The empirical distribution of changes in 
absolute return, using the yearly observations to form a sample, is shown in Figure 6. While the 
median change in absolute return is indeed negative (a 5 percent reduction using the 10 day 
window, and a 1 percent reduction using the 4 day window), there is much variation, with the 
upper quartiles indicating increases in volatility (7 percent and 4 percent, respectively). The 
largest reduction in absolute returns is 15 percent for the 10 day window and, excepting one clear 
outlier, 12 percent for the 4 day window. Taking a conservative approach, we set the reduction 
1 − 	 to 15 percent. Figure 7 shows the graphs of the illiquidity ratio, ILLIQ, and our adjusted 
ratio, ILLIQ_A, with the further modifications to the simulations to permit reductions in 
volatility and persistence in volatility following periods of non-trading. Comparing Figure 7 to 
Figure 5, which has neither of these features, we can see that the combined effects of persistence 
and the drop in volatility causes a small reduction in the bias in ILLIQ. Again, however, the 
ability of ILLIQ_A to reduce this bias is not noticeably altered. Thus, our adjusted illiquidity 
ratio continues to perform well in the presence of complex interrelationships between volume 
and volatility.23 
                                                          
21
 The returns data set is described in Section 3.1 below. 
22
 Since volatility has been observed to increase following weekends, see e.g., French and Roll (1986), any dampening effect of 
non-trading could be offset by such an increase if the non-trading period starts on a Monday. So, to provide the most conservative 
estimate, we exclude non-trading periods that commence on a Monday. This actually has very little effect on the observed 
changes in volatility following non-trading that we find. 
23
 While our simulations show that non-trading effects act mostly through the numerator of the Amihud ratio, two 
recent studies indicate that for cross section asset pricing the denominator of the ratio may also be important. Lou 
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 [Figure 6] 
[Figure 7] 
The next two sections explain the methods and report the results of our empirical analysis 
to both validate our proposed non-trading adjustment and explore the consequences of non-
trading in the empirical measurement of the illiquidity ratio. 
3. Data and Empirical Methods 
3.1 Cross-section asset pricing tests 
 
We estimate illiquidity premia using Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional asset pricing 
regressions. Each month excess stock returns are regressed against stock characteristics, 
including the illiquidity ratio, along with estimated betas from market-wide risk factors. The time 
series means of the monthly regression slopes generate standard tests of whether the components 
of the risk premia are priced. We compute time series means of the coefficients from cross-
section regressions which utilize one of the two illiquidity ratios and examine whether there are 
differences in the slope coefficients of the two measures.  
The data used in this sample includes all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ ordinary common 
stocks listed on the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database between the period January 1960 to 
December 200824. From this database, we extract, for each security, return, volume and market 
equity information. Following, Fama and French (1992), we match the market equity 
information for fiscal year ends in calendar year t-1 with the returns from July of year t to June 
of year t+1, to ensure that these variables are known when returns are generated. We also require 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and Shu (2014) isolate the volume component of the ratio and suggest that it is dominant in explaining return 
premia. Brennan et al (2013), using a turnover (rather than dollar volume) based measure, find that order flow sign 
influences the pricing of the Amihud ratio. 
24
 Ordinary common stocks are identified using the CRSP share codes 10 and 11. The sample for NYSE/AMEX stocks ranges 
from 1960-2008. Due to the limited availability of volume data required to calculate the illiquidity ratio the NASDAQ sample 
ranges from 1983-2008.  
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that the stocks have at least 2 years of monthly returns preceding July in year t for the calculation 
of pre-ranking betas. 
The estimation of betas on market-wide risk factors makes use of the two-step procedure 
described by Fama and French (1992). In June each year, stocks are allocated to one of twenty-
five portfolios  formed on the basis of independent quintile rankings of size and then individual 
stock beta estimates (we use between two and five years of prior data, as available, to estimate 
beta). 
Monthly percentage portfolio returns are created as the cross-section average of 
component stock returns in excess of the risk free rate. Portfolio betas are estimated using time-
series regressions of portfolio returns on the overall market return, the Fama and French (1993) 
HML, SMB and momentum (Mom) factors, and a market-wide measure of illiquidity risk. 
Chordia et al (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and Eckbo and Norli (2002) are representative 
of studies that are increasingly recognizing the role of an illiquidity-based systematic risk factor 
while Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and Pederson (2005) provide evidence that 
systematic illiquidity risk generates a risk premium.  
The data on market returns and returns to the Fama and French (1993) HML, SMB and 
momentum (Mom) risk factors are obtained from Kenneth French’s website. Our measure of 
market-wide illiquidity risk is the innovation variable (ps_innov) based on equation (8) of Pastor 
and Stambaugh (2003, page 652).25 This has been used previously by Asparouhova, 
Bessembinder and Kalcheva (2010) and Hasbrouck (2009) to capture systematic illiquidity. 
The resulting full-period post rank beta estimates for a portfolio are assigned to each stock 
contained in that portfolio, and are combined with stock characteristics in the monthly cross-
section regressions. We also use a range of firm risk characteristics as recommended by Daniel 
                                                          
25
 This data was obtained from the WRDS. 
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and Titman (1997). Size is the logarithm of the security market equity value at the end of the 
previous year, book-to-market value (B/M) is the ratio of book equity to market equity of the 
firm measured at the end of the previous year. We are motivated to include the previous six 
month security return to capture the relationship between prior return and current return to 
capture momentum effects. We use six monthly returns, as Hong et al (1999) show this to be the 
most profitable momentum strategy. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that turnover is an 
important predictor of return and so we therefore include turnover as an alternative measure of 
liquidity. We also include the Roll (1984) effective spread measure, recently used in asset pricing 
tests by Asparouhova et al (2010) and Hasbrouck (2009).  
Illiquidity is measured using either the un-scaled or scaled Amihud illiquidity ratio, in a 
standardized form. Since market-wide illiquidity is time varying, Amihud (2002) recommends 
dividing the illiquidity ratio by the average illiquidity ratio of the market. For example, in the 
case of ILLIQi,y, which is the annual average daily ratio (for stock i in year y) of absolute return 
to volume (multiplied by 106), with zero volume days omitted, the average illiquidity ratio across 
all stocks is given by  
AILLIQ =
1 ILLIQ,


 
(10) 
 
where Ny is the number of stocks in year y. The standardized illiquidity ratio for each security is 
given by ILLIQMAi,y = ILLIQi,y / AILLIQy. The monthly cross-section regressions use the 
standardized illiquidity ratio calculated using data from the previous calendar year.  
 The adjusted illiquidity ratio, ILLIQ_Ai,y, is obtained by adjusting ILLIQi,y, as given in 
equation (2), by the scaling identified in equation (8), to give 
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ILLIQ_A, = 2, − ,
2,  
1, − ,
,,,,
,,

 
(11) 
 
A standardized version of the adjusted measure, ILLIQMA_Ai,y, is obtained by dividing 
ILLIQ_Ai,y by the average value across all firms in the year, in the same manner as for the 
unadjusted measure.  
In each cross-section equation we utilize in turn as a measure of illiquidity, ILLIQMA 
and ILLIQMA_A.26 This allows time-series averages of coefficient differences between 
ILLIQMA and ILLIQMA_A to be examined. These differences are important because, if 
statistically significant, they capture the magnitude by which the illiquidity premium coefficients 
are potentially distorted. 
Since the ILLIQMA_A adjusted illiquidity measure is a downward scaled version of the 
ILLIQMA illiquidity measure, it is tempting to expect that the estimated coefficient in the cross 
section regressions will be greater. This would imply that the upward bias in the illiquidity ratio 
identified in the simulations generates a downward bias in the premium on illiquidity. However, 
this line of reasoning ignores the cross section variation in the scaling itself, which depends on 
the extent of non-trading days for each security.27 The adjusted illiquidity ratio is effectively an 
interaction variable, which measures the effect of the interaction of both the number of non-
trading days and the illiquidity ratio (measured from trading days only). As it is possible for the 
number of non-trading days and the illiquidity ratio to be correlated empirically, the covariance 
                                                          
26
 We drop the firm and year identifying subscripts from here onwards, so the variable definitions can become the variable 
names. 
27
 If there is no cross section variation in the non-trading days among securities, and it is assumed that the illiquidity ratio is not 
scaled by the average ratio across stocks, it is simple to show that the regression coefficient on the unadjusted ratio would indeed 
be lower. The scaling on the adjusted ratio reduces the variance component of the regression coefficient by the scaling factor 
squared and only reduces the covariance element by the scaling factor. Since the scaling factor is between zero and one, the 
overall impact would be to raise the regression coefficient on the adjusted ratio. 
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and variance terms that make up the regression coefficient of this interaction variable are 
complicated functions of the means, variances and pair-wise covariances between average 
returns, the illiquidity ratio and the number of non-trading days, and also of these moments of the 
squared values of these three variables, see Bohrnstedt and Goldberger (1969). Therefore, the 
sign of the difference between the estimated regression coefficients on the illiquidity ratio and 
the adjusted ratio is an empirical matter.  
In common with Amihud (2002) and later applications that utilize the illiquidity ratio, we 
exclude stocks from the sample in any year when CRSP data is available for less than 200 days. 
This excludes from the sample firms with extreme thin trading, although our earlier analysis 
shows that lower levels of thin trading can still generate important biases. Within the final 
sample there are on average 2390 NYSE/AMEX stocks each month and an average of 4180 
NASDAQ stocks. 
 
3.2 Testing the relationship with transaction measures of illiquidity 
Amihud (2002) showed that ILLIQ is positively related to both the Kyle (1985) price 
impact measure, which we denote λ, and the fixed-cost component of the spread, which we 
denote as ψ. Using estimates of the Kyle impact measure and the fixed cost component obtained 
from a Glosten and Harris (1988) regression of intraday quotes and transactions for the year 
1984, Amihud showed that the illiquidity ratio was strongly related to these transaction based 
estimates of illiquidity. It is important therefore to establish that our adjustment to the illiquidity 
ratio does not diminish the relationship between the illiquidity ratio and the price impact measure 
and fixed-cost component of the spread. To achieve this, we re-examine the regression equation 
employed by Amihud, 
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!, = " + #$, + %&, + ', (12) 
 
where !, is, in turn, the Amihud ratio, ILLIQi,t or our adjusted ratio ILLIQ_Ai,t.  
We use the NYSE trades and quotes (TAQ) database for the period 1993-2008 to 
estimate the Kyle impact factor and fixed-cost component using the procedure developed in 
Glosten and Harris (1988), and match the data to CRSP return and volume data over the same 
period for the calculation of the illiquidity ratios. We then undertake the regression as a panel 
using both time and firm fixed effects for the period 1993-2008, using samples based on all firms 
and for firms sorted into quintiles by size. We undertake a test of the null hypothesis that the 
difference between the average R-squared from the regression with ILLIQ_Ai,t and the 
companion regression with ILLIQi,t is zero, by estimating the regression model separately for 
each year, and using the R-squared values from each year to calculate a mean, either for a given 
size quintile or for the full sample. Additionally, we re-run the regressions of the equation pairs 
(ILLIQi,t  and ILLIQ_Ai,t ) as a SUR system and test whether the coefficients # and % are 
significantly different across the equation pairs. We also examine a regression of the difference 
between ILLIQi,t  and ILLIQ_Ai,t against the price impact measure and fixed cost component 
measure to examine how the bias adjustment itself relates to these measures. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
 
To gauge the likelihood of needing to adjust the illiquidity ratio for zero volume days, Panels A 
and B of Table 2, report the observed proportions of zero volume days for stocks, sorted into 
deciles by capitalization, on the NYSE/AMEX (1960-2008) and NASDAQ (1983-2008) 
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exchanges, respectively. It can be seen that the small firm decile proportions of zero volume days 
are 21.56 percent for NYSE/AMEX stocks and 22.89 percent for NASDAQ stocks. Even at such 
modest levels of thin trading, the observed illiquidity ratio, in Figure 1 is around 12 percent 
higher than the illiquidity ratio would be if calculated for unobserved returns. Moreover, the full 
sample averages conceal considerable variation in the annual proportions that reach values as 
high as 39.93 percent and 45.57 percent, respectively.  
[Table 2] 
 
Table 3 provides summary statistics on security market value, daily volume, the un-scaled and 
scaled measures of illiquidity along with the inflation adjusted un-scaled and scaled illiquidity 
ratio28. For comparability with other studies, we also report summary statistics for the portfolio 
betas associated with the risk factors and also present summary information for the risk 
characteristics. Statistics are provided for three sample periods, 1960-2008, 1960-2000 and 2001-
2008 for NYSE/AMEX, in Panel A, and 1983-2008, 1983-2000 and 2001-2008 for NASDAQ, in 
Panel B. The sample break at 2001 recognizes the introduction of decimalization at this time. 
On average, illiquidity is higher for NASDAQ securities during its full sample period 
than it is for NYSE/AMEX during its full sample29. The mean values of ILLIQ and ILLIQ_A for 
NYSE/AMEX securities are 15.85 and 14.52 respectively (p value for the difference using a t-
test and a Wilcoxon test is 0), and are 20.94 and 18.04 for NASDAQ securities (p value for the 
difference using a t-test and a Wilcoxon test is 0). We find that inflation modified illiquidity 
ratios are much larger due to the deflation of dollar volume30. Over time there is a high 
correlation between the inflation modified and unmodified illiquidity ratios (correlations are 
                                                          
28
 Dollar volume is adjusted to real dollar volume by using the US consumer price index. Using real volume we then calculate the 
unscaled and scaled illiquidity ratio as outlined previously.   
29
 Had we been able to study an earlier period for NASDAQ these differences would have been even larger as the earlier period 
represented a period of higher illiquidity.  
30
 Differences between the two inflation adjusted measures are also significant using a t-test and a Wilcoxon test for both NYSE 
and NASDAQ stocks.  
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about 45% for NYSE/AMEX and about 90% for NASDAQ). Adjusting for inflation reveals that 
real illiquidity was highest for NYSE/AMEX stocks during the 1970’s oil crisis. Real illiquidity 
is elevated during the early 1990’s for NYSE/AMEX Stocks and NASDAQ stocks. We also find 
that both markets have elevated illiquidity during the 2007-2008 financial crash but the rise in 
illiquidity at this time is especially acute for NASDAQ stocks and even more pronounced than 
was evident with non inflation adjusted illiquidity ratios.  
[Table 3]  
Comparisons of the two sub-sample periods for the NYSE/AMEX stocks indicate that 
during the period 2001-2008 there has been a substantial decline in illiquidity. The values of 
ILLIQ and ILLIQ_A fall from 16.37 and 15.05 in the 1960-2000 period to 4.98 and 4.65 
respectively in the 2001-2008 period. This may be explained by the huge increase in volume that 
takes place during the 2001-2008 period, caused by decimalization and the increased prevalence 
of high frequency traders. During the period 2001-2008 the potential measurement bias in ILLIQ 
also declines, probably due to the increased trading activity that takes place. The NASDAQ 
sample also displays a decline in illiquidity in this later period and a corresponding increase in 
volume. These changes are smaller than those observable for the NYSE/AMEX markets but also 
generate a reduction in the divergence between illiquidity measures. Overall, the illiquidity 
characteristics of stocks on NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ are consistent with the potential biases 
in the measurement of illiquidity due to non-trading. Relatively large divergences between the 
adjusted and unadjusted measures are seen for the relatively more illiquid NASDAQ market. 
 
4.2 Relation to transactions measures of illiquidity 
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Table 4, Panel A, shows the estimated coefficients from the regressions relating ILLIQ 
and ILLIQ_A to the Kyle (1985) price impact measure, λ, and the fixed-cost component of the 
spread, ψ, estimated as a panel across all firms and for all years. It can be seen that both ILLIQ 
and ILLIQ_A are significantly related to both the price impact measures and to the fixed-cost 
component measure. The significance levels are stronger for both variables in the case of our 
adjusted measure, ILLIQ_A, and this is reflected in a higher R-squared. In Panel A, we also 
show the results of the regression of the difference between ILLIQ and ILLIQ_A on the price 
impact measure, λ, and the fixed-cost component of the spread, ψ, which shows that the bias 
adjustment is significantly related to both of these measures. 
To determine whether the observed increase in R-squared for our measure is significant, 
we re-estimate the model separately for each year in the sample, to estimate a mean R-squared 
value. We do this for each of ILLIQ and ILLIQ_A. We then use these means and the sampling 
distribution across the years to test whether the difference between the means is significantly 
different from zero. We report these results in Panel B of Table 4. For the full sample, we reject 
the hypothesis that the average difference in R-squared is zero (p<0.01), and so conclude that 
ILLIQ_A has a stronger relation to the transactions measures of illiquidity than did ILLIQ. When 
we repeat this exercise for separate size-based quintiles, we find that the differences in the R-
squared values are positive in each case, indicating a stronger relationship with ILLIQ_A, and 
that the differences are greater for smaller firms, where we would expect the differences between 
ILLIQ and ILLIQ_A to matter most. The differences are significantly higher for all except the 
large firm quintile. From Table 2, we can see that there is relatively little thin trading in the two 
deciles containing the largest firms, and so this means that ILLIQ_A and ILLIQ are likely to be 
equal for the vast majority of firms of this size anyway. When we undertake the same exercise 
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using the R-squared values from the regressions of the difference between ILLIQ and ILLIQ_A 
on the transactions based measures, we find confirmatory results. These are shown in Panel C of 
Table 4.  
We also run the regressions relating ILLIQ and ILLIQ_A to the Kyle (1985) price impact 
measure, λ, and the fixed-cost component of the spread, ψ, as a two equation SUR system. This 
enables us to test directly whether the coefficients on λ and ψ are equal across the two equations. 
Chi-squared tests indicate that the coefficients across the two equations are significantly different 
(λ: ( = 47.70,	p<0.01) and (ψ: ( = 19.02,	p<0.01). In all cases, therefore, ILLIQ_A never 
produces a worse relationship to transactions measures of illiquidity, and mostly produces an 
improved relationship.  
   
We also find that the scaled illiquidity ratio has a slightly higher correlation with volume 
and effective spread than the unscaled measure. However, because the effective spread and 
volume are different types of liquidity to the price impact effects, increases in correlation are in 
the region of 2-3%.  
 [Table 4] 
4.3 Cross-section asset pricing tests 
In this section we examine how the illiquidity premium could be influenced by the potential bias 
in the measurement of illiquidity. Tables 5 and 6 report the time series averages of OLS 
estimates of Fama and MacBeth cross-section regressions using all available NYSE/AMEX or 
NASDAQ securities, for the periods 1960-2008 and 1983-2008 respecitvely. Panel A of each 
table reports results of regressions of stock returns on market beta, βrm and illiquidity, Panel B 
reports results for a five factor model augmented with illiquidity, Panel C reports the results for a 
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five factor model plus illiquidity, size, firm level momentum and the book-to-market ratio. Panel 
D provides the results for the model in Panel C which is further extended by the inclusion of two 
widely used alternative measures of liquidity; the Roll spread and turnover. For each market, and 
for each specification, there are two versions of the cross-section models. Each version in turn 
uses one of the two measures of illiquidity; ILLIQMA and ILLIQMA_A as defined earlier. The 
column DIF reports the time series mean of the difference in the cross-sectional estimate of the 
coefficients from the model containing ILLIQMA and the same specification containing 
ILLIQMA_A instead. From this column we are particularly interested to discover whether 
significant differences exist between the coefficients on ILLIQMA and ILLIQMA_A. If these 
differences reflect a bias in the measurement of illiquidity, then this DIF coefficient will be 
statistically significant. The t-statistics are computed using the Shanken (1992) adjustment for 
errors-in-variables,31 which as noted by Hasbrouck (2009) is equivalent to a generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimation.  
The regressions undertaken for NYSE/AMEX securities, reported in Table 5, 
demonstrate that the illiquidity premium associated with ILLIQMA is statistically significant. 
The results contained in Panel A show that the coefficient on ILLIQMA is 0.168. As we add 
more explanatory variables the illiquidity premium coefficient tends to fall. In Panel D the 
coefficient on ILLIQMA is 0.084. We find that the coefficient on ILLIQMA is below the 
coefficient on the adjusted illiquidity ratio, ILLIQMA_A, which ranges from 0.189 in Panel A to 
0.092 in Panel D. Moreover, as shown by the results in the DIF column, differences between the 
                                                          
31
 The errors-in-variables problem arises as betas from the first pass are estimated with error, causing an underestimate of beta 
risk and an overstatement in the second pass coefficients of other variables. Although using portfolios to estimate beta in the first 
pass mitigates this problem, the use of Shanken (1992) t-statistics allows any residual errors-in-variables biases to be corrected.  
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ILLIQMA and ILLIQMA_A coefficients range from -0.023 in Panel B to -0.008  in Panel D and 
are significant in all specifications. 32  
[Table 5] 
 Figure 6 traces out the proportion of the illiquidity premium that this difference between 
the ILLIQMA and ILLIQMA_A coefficients represents and shows that omitting zero volume 
days, without a re-adjustment to the measurement of illiquidity, potentially leads to a substantial 
understatement of the illiquidity premium in each specification. Figure 8 shows that this 
understatement in the illiquidity premium coefficients (and therefore the premium) is between -
17.3% (Panel B results) and -8.6% (Panel C). This potential understatement in the illiquidity 
premium is also significant in economic terms. The standard deviation of ILLIQMA during the 
period 1960-2008 is 2.76. For a researcher estimating the effect on expected returns of a two 
standard deviation change in ILLIQMA would understate the change in the illiquidity premium 
by 2*2.76*-0.023=0.13% on a monthly basis, based on the Panel B results in Table 5. This is 
equivalent to 1.52% on an annualized basis. The results in Panel D indicate an understatement in 
the change on the illiquidity premium of 2*2.76*-0.008=-0.044% on a monthly basis, or -0.53% 
when annualized.  
[Figure 8] 
The results presented for NASDAQ securities are broadly consistent with those found for 
NYSE/AMEX stocks. Panel A of Table 6 shows that the coefficients on ILLIQMA and 
ILLIQMA_A are 0.140 and 0.165 respectively. As we move from Panel A to Panel D these 
coefficients decline in value. Panel D reports coefficients on ILLIQMA and ILLIQMA_A of 
0.033 and 0.041 respectively. These differences within each panel point to an under-estimation 
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 Asparouhova et al (2010) recommend using weighted least squares (WLS) to account for possible correlation between the 
measure of illiquidity and noise in prices. We re-examine all the cross section regression specifications using WLS. The 
difference in coefficients between ILLIQMA and ILLIQMA_A remains statistically significant. 
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of the premium using the unadjusted illiquidity measure, ILLIQMA. The coefficient on 
illiquidity in the DIF column is negative in each of Panel A to D, ranging from -0.025 in Panel A 
to -0.008 in Panel D. Coefficients decline in value and significance as we move to Panel D 
because there is collinearity between the different liquidity measures and the illiquidity ratios33. 
Figure 9 shows that this bias in the illiquidity premium ranges from -24.24% (based on Panel D) 
to -15.3% (based on Panel C). Although the point estimates vary slightly from one specification 
to another the impact on the illiquidity premium is quite robust and slightly larger than for the 
NYSE.  
A change in ILLIQMA by two standard deviations leads to an under-estimate of the 
change in the illiquidity premium of 2*2.75*-0.25 = -0.14% a month, or -1.65% on an 
annualised basis, based on  the results in Panel A. For Panel D’s specification, the under-estimate 
would be 2*2.75*-0.008= -0.044% a month, or -0.53% on an annualised basis. The impact of the 
monthly bias on NASDAQ stocks is therefore comparable to that for the NYSE/AMEX stocks.  
[Table 6] 
[Figure 9] 
As a robustness exercise we also undertake a two stage regression. In the first stage we regress 
ILLIQMA_A on ILLIQMA. The residuals from this regression leave a measure of illiquidity that 
is free from the Amihud unadjusted measure while retaining the difference between the Ahihud 
ratio and the adjusted ratio. We then regress the residuals from this regression against variables 
used in the cross-section of expected returns (Table 5 and 6).  The illiquidity variable in these 
regressions comprises of  the residuals from the first stage regression. The results of the second 
stage regression are provided in Table 5 for NYSE firms and Table 6 for NASDAQ firms and 
                                                          
33
 For example, the correlation between the illiquidity ratios and the effective spread is over 60% while there is strong negative 
correlation between volume and the illiquidity ratios.  
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shows that in all four panels the residuals are significant. This suggests that the adjusted measure 
of illiquidity contains elements that are priced by returns and these can not be related to the 
unadjusted Amihud ratio as these have already been extracted.  
 
The cross section regression results have important implications not only for the pricing 
of illiquidity risk, but also for the pricing of many of the other risk variables and firm 
characteristics that are included in the regressions. Many of these variables are priced and the use 
of a potentially biased illiquidity measure may cause significant bias in their coefficient values 
also. There are many instances in Tables 5 and 6 of significant coefficient differences, in the DIF 
column, for explanatory variables other than the measure of illiquidity. Significant values of DIF 
capture the understatement in the premium due to the bias in the illiquidity ratio. Since thin 
trading causes the bias in the Amihud ratio, DIF will be partially correlated with the number of 
zero volume days. As shown by Lesmond et al (1999) the number of zero volume days can be a 
useful measure of illiquidity in itself although it is designed to capture a very different aspect of 
illiquidity to the Amihud ratio (which is concerned with price impacts). However, our concern in 
this paper is to make the Amihud ratio as effective as possible at capturing the form of illiquidity 
it sets out to measure34.  
4.4 Sub-period Analysis 
The cross section asset pricing tests indicate that the upward bias in the measurement of 
illiquidity results in an understatement of the illiquidity premium. In this section, we report the 
results from estimating the cross section asset pricing models for the following sub-samples. For 
                                                          
34
 There are a range of different measures of illiquidity including the effective spread, volume, number of trades, zero volume 
days as well as the illiquidity ratio. Each of these measures captures a different dimension to liquidity/illiquidity and as shown by 
Aitken and Comerton-Forde (2003) who shown that illiquidity measures are not always highly correlated with each other.   
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the NYSE/AMEX sample of stocks, we use the two periods 1960-2000 and 2001-2008. For 
NASDAQ, we examine the periods 1983-2000 and 2001-2008. We split the sub-periods into 
before and after 2001 as from this period several important changes took place to the trading 
environment which may have had an impact on non-trading.  
 
On January 29, 2001 the NYSE introduced decimal pricing35 and reduced the minimum 
tick size to one per cent. These changes, coupled with the increased utilisation of high 
frequency trading algorithms and changes to the trading environment have led to reduced 
spreads (Bessembinder (2003)) and an increase in trading volume (Chakravarty, Van Ness and 
Van Ness (2005)) especially in small stocks.  
The results are reported in Tables 7 to 10, where Panel A reports results of regressions of 
stock returns on market beta βrm,  and one of the two measures of illiquidity, while Panel B to D 
report results for the extended specifications, which include the wider range of explanatory 
variables. 
[Table 7] 
In Table 7, for NYSE/AMEX stocks during the period 1960-2000, the coefficients on 
ILLIQMA and ILLIQMA_A displayed in Panel A are 0.179 and 0.201, respectively. As more 
explanatory variables are included in the specification the size of the coefficients on illiquidity 
tend to fall. In Panel D, the two illiquidity coefficients are 0.087 and 0.096 respectively. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients on the illiquidity measures across the different cross-section 
regressions specifications are comparable to those reported in Table 5 for the full-sample period, 
                                                          
35
 Decimalization actually took place in four stages. Seven stocks traded by one specialist converted to decimal 
pricing in August 2000, 57 stocks on September 25 2000, 94 stocks on December 4th and the remaining stocks 
January 29 2001.   
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1960 to 2008.  In all specifications, the difference between the coefficient values of ILLIQMA 
and ILLIQMA_A are significant. The coefficient differences range from -0.024 to -0.008 again 
showing that the coefficients on the unadjusted ratio, ILLIQMA, are potentially understated. 
Figure 8 shows that these differences imply an understatement of the illiquidity premium in the 
period 1960-2000 equivalent to 16.7% (Panel B) and 8.94% (Panel C) of its value. These 
differences are also of similar magnitude to those found for the full sample period.  
In Table 8, we report the results for NYSE/AMEX stocks for the period 2001-2008. 
During this relatively short period, both ILLIQMA and ILLIQMA_A are priced in all 
specifications, although the coefficient magnitudes tend to be smaller than during the period 
1960-2000. The other risk variables that we use in the various specifications fail to be 
significantly priced, with the exception of the previous six month return and the effective spread. 
The coefficient differences for the illiquidity measures in the DIF column are significant in all 
specifications, but are lower in this period than in either the full sample or the sub-period 1960-
2000. Although the difference between the measures, and so the impact on the illiquidity 
premium has fallen in this more recent sub-sample, this does not mean that the adjustment for 
non-trading is less important. On the contrary, because the overall level of liquidity has been 
increasing in recent years, which is responsible for reducing the size of both measures of 
illiquidity, the size of the coefficient differences between the two measures increases in relative 
importance.  For the period, 2001-2008, the potential understatement of the illiquidity premium 
ranges between 21.13%, using Panel B results, see Figure 8, and 8.00% of the premium using 
Panel C results. 
[Table 8] 
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Table 9 reports the results for NASDAQ during the period 1983-2000. The ILLIQMA and 
ILLIQMA_A coefficients displayed in Panel A are 0.147 and 0.173 respectively. The price of 
illiquidity risk declines as we move from Panel A to Panel D and is not significant in Panel C or 
D. The coefficient difference values in the DIF column are significant in both Panel A and B, 
ranging from -0.026 in Panel A to -0.023 Panel B. Figure 9 shows that these magnitudes imply 
that the illiquidity premium of ILLIQMA is understated during the period 1983-2000 by between 
17.68% (Panel A) and 17.29% % (Panel B). These for this sub-sample are comparable to the 
results discussed in Table 6 for the full -period 1983-2008. Table 10 provides the results for 
NASDAQ stocks during the 2001-2008 period. The coefficients associated with illiquidity are 
lower than for the period 1983-2000, but remain significant in all specifications except that of 
Panel D. The coefficient difference values in the DIF column are comparable to those presented 
for the earlier period, and imply that the illiquidity premium of ILLIQMA is understated during 
the period 2001-2008 by between 21.05%  (Panel A) and 17.88% (Panel B)36. 
Comparison of the results for NASDAQ in Table 10 with those presented in Table 8 for 
NYSE/AMEX stocks, which both use the same sample period of 2001-2008, shows that on 
average across the cross section specifications the potential understatement of the illiquidity 
premium is larger for NASDAQ than for NYSE/AMEX stocks during this period.  
[Table 9] 
 [Table 10] 
 
                                                          
36
 We also examine other sub-periods including sub-periods of equal length for each market and find our findings 
that the Amihud ratio understates the risk premium associated with illiquidity is robust. 
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4.5 The Square Root Transformation of the Illiquidity Ratio 
Although most applications of the illiquidity ratio utilize the ratio which is computed exactly as 
shown by Amihud (2002), Hasbrouck (2009) noted that a square root transformation of the 
illiquidity ratio may perform better empirically. Recent applications of the illiquidity ratio by 
both Hasbrouck (2009) and Asparouhova, Bessembinder and Kalcheva (2010) have used this 
version of the illiquidity ratio. So, in this section, we show that our results are robust to this 
transformation. However, we also note that if no adjustments are made for thin trading bias, 
utilisation of the square root transformation will provide slightly less biased measures of the 
illiquidity premium. 
We calculate the square root illiquidity ratio, √ILLIQMA, following the procedure used 
by Hasbrouck (2009). We compute daily values of ILLIQ (the daily absolute return to volume 
ratio), the square root transformation is then applied. These values are averaged over the year to 
obtain a transformed security illiquidity ratio, √ILLIQ. For use in the cross-section tests, we 
scale the transformed security ratios by the average (transformed) ratio across all available stocks 
in the market, to generate √ILLIQMA. Days which contain zero volume are omitted. The non-
trading adjusted measure, √ILLIQMA_A, is calculated by applying the scaling 
), +), − , 2),  , to √ILLIQMA. This scaling follows from equation (8). 
 [Table 11] 
In Table 11 we report the Fama and MacBeth cross section regression results for 
NYSE/AMEX stocks for the same four model specifications used in earlier tests. The results 
show that the illiquidity premium coefficients are larger than was the case without the square 
root transformation and are comparable to the estimates provided by Hasbrouck (2009) and 
Asparouhova, Bessembinder and Kalcheva (2010) who also use the square root transformation. 
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The values of the coefficients on √ILLIQMA and √ILLIQMA_A are 0.357 and 0.377 
respectively (Panel A). The illiquidity coefficients are significant in all specifications. In Panel A 
to C the coefficient values are similar but are slightly lower in Panel D, the specification 
containing the greatest number of explanatory variables. The coefficient difference for the 
illiquidity measures in column DIF is also significant in all equations, again indicating a 
potential downwards bias in the illiquidity premium, ranging from -0.033 in Panel B to -0.006 in 
Panel D. The results presented for NYSE/AMEX stocks show that the square root transformation 
reduces the bias but does not eliminate it. This provides further support for using the square root 
transformation, especially if our proposed adjustment for thin trading is not made.  
The results for NASDAQ stocks are contained in Table 12. The magnitude and pattern of 
results associated with illiquidity are comparable to those presented for the NYSE/AMEX stocks 
contained in Table 11.  All measures of illiquidity are highly significant. The coefficients on 
√ILLIQMA and √ILLIQMA_A contained in Panel A are 0.341 and 0.369 respectively and fall to 
0.067 and 0.078 in panel D. The DIF coefficient values for the illiquidity measures range from -
0.032 in Panel B to -0.014 in Panel C signifying that in each specification there is a potential 
understatement of the illiquidity premium. Our results regarding the size of the potential bias are 
consistent with the findings for the NYSE/AMEX sample. The square root transformation 
reduces the bias but does not eliminate it.  
[Table 12] 
5. Conclusions  
The Amihud-illiquidity ratio is now widely used to capture illiquidity in asset markets. However, 
the impact that thin trading has on its measurement has not been explored previously. This paper 
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has examined the possible empirical biases that could be introduced both to the measurement of 
the illiquidity ratio and to estimates of the illiquidity premium because of thin trading.  
We assess, through a simulation analysis, the relationship between thin trading and the 
measurement of illiquidity. When calculating the illiquidity ratio, which is an average of the 
daily ratios of absolute return to volume, it is standard practice to extract days of zero volume 
because the illiquidity ratio is mathematically undefined in these cases. Our simulations show 
that omitting these days from the computation of the illiquidity ratio can cause an upwards bias 
in the estimate of  the illiquidity ratio. To counter this potential bias, we propose an almost bias 
free illiquidity ratio that is easily computed and will reflect the original measure when there is no 
thin trading. This measure involves applying a scaling factor to the illiquidity ratio that is a 
function of the number of possible trading days and the number of these days in which the stock 
actually traded.  
We analyse the illiquidity ratios of stocks listed on the NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ 
exchanges. The computation of the scaled and un-scaled illiquidity ratios suggests that there may 
be important biases in empirical since we find sizeable differences between the two ratios. 
Comparison of the NYSE/AMEX and the NASDAQ samples show that these differences are 
larger on the less liquid NASDAQ. When we analyse for each market groups of companies 
formed into deciles on the basis of market value we find that the divergence between the 
different illiquidity measures increases as we move from the large firm decile to the small firm 
decile. We also examine the measures of illiquidity using data observed at different frequencies. 
For lower frequency data, we find smaller differences between the two illiquidity measures. 
These results regarding both firm size and data observation frequency are consistent with thin 
trading being the underlying cause of the divergences between the illiquidity ratios.  
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Our summary statistics are complemented by a range of Fama and MacBeth style asset 
pricing tests, which include a range of control variables including alternative measures of 
liquidity. These regressions show that there are significant differences between the coefficients 
on the adjusted and unadjusted illiquidity ratios. During the period 1960-2008 the regression 
results suggest that, by omitting zero volume days when calculating the illiquidity ratio, the 
illiquidity premium coefficient associated with NYSE/AMEX stocks may be biased downwards 
by over 17%. For NASDAQ securities during the later period 1983-2008 the regressions suggest 
that the illiquidity premium may be biased downwards by up to 24%. These results are robust to 
re-examination in sub-samples of the full time-span of data and to use of the square-root form of 
the illiquidity ratio proposed by Hasbrouck (2009). 
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Table 1: Mean absolute percentage errors for liquidity measures calculated from simulated returns data 
Summary statistics on the mean absolute percentage error between a liquidity measure featuring non-trading and the measure for the same simulated returns 
when the non-trading probability is zero. ILLIQ is the Amihud (2002) measure with non-trading days excluded. ILLIQ_A is the measure ILLIQ scaled by (2T-τ)/2T, 
where T is the number of possible trading days and τ is the number of zero volume days within T. The absolute percentage error for a given percentile is the 
absolute percentage error between the liquidity measure for that percentile non-trading probability and the measure with a zero non-trading probability. 
 Non-trading probability deciles Full 
Illiquidity Ratio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Sample 
ILLIQ 2.49 7.37 13.73 21.17 30.42 43.82 61.80 89.06 144.31 363.18 74.85 
ILLIQ_A 0.42 1.00 1.01 0.66 0.60 3.73 8.78 18.04 40.04 141.69 20.38 
 
 
Table 2: Zero Volume Days for NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ stocks 
 
Summary statistics relating to occurrences of zero daily volume on trading days for stocks on NYSE/AMEX (1960-2008) and NASDAQ (1983-2008), sorted by 
capitalization. The proportion of zero volume days is calculated for each stock as the number of zero volume days divided by the number of trading days within 
the year. This proportion is then averaged across all stocks in the decile for a given year, and then averaged across all the years for each decile. Decile number 1 
contains the smallest stocks by capitalization. The figures in parentheses below the zero volume proportions are the standard deviation of the annual figures 
giving a measure of the variation in the proportion of zero volume days across time. Zero volume days with non-zero returns gives the percentage of trading days 
where volume was zero and the return was non-zero, and is computed following the same steps as for the proportion of zero volume days.  
 Averages across stocks by capitalization decile 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  Panel A NYSE-AMEX 1960-2008 
Zero volume days (%) 21.56 12.56 8.08 4.93 3.01 2.02 1.27 0.83 0.32 0.07 
 (8.44) (5.78) (4.09) (3.29) (2.48) (2.00) (1.25) (0.98) (0.47) (0.12) 
 Panel B NASDAQ 1983-2008 
Zero volume days (%) 22.89 16.81 13.15 9.44 7.08 5.00 3.41 2.28 1.21 0.41 
 (10.39) (7.79) (6.16) (5.00) (4.38) (3.92) (3.11) (2.15) (1.25) (0.48) 
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                                                              Table 3: Summary Statistics 
This table reports mean, median, standard deviation (St Dev.) values of the following variables.  MV is the logarithm of December  market value. Volume is 
daily volume in millions of US dollars. ILLIQ and ILLIQ_A are the illiquidity ratios computed from daily information multiplied by 10
6
. ILLIQ is computed 
using all available data but excluding zero volume days. ILLIQ_A is ILLIQ scaled by scaled by (2T-τ)/2T, where T is the number of possible trading days and τ 
is the number of zero volume days within T. ILLIQ-ILLIQ_A % Diff is the percentage difference between ILLIQ and ILLIQ_A. iILLIQ and iILLIQ_A are the 
inflation adjusted illiquidity ratios, βrm is the estimated portfolio market beta from the twenty five portfolios, βSMB  is the estimated beta on the Fama-
French SMB factor from the twenty five portfolios, βHML  is the is the estimated beta on the Fama-French HML factor from the twenty five portfolios. βps is 
the beta  on the Pastor-Stambaugh market-wide illiquidity factor from the twenty five portfolios. ΒMom is the beta on the Fama-French Mom factor from 
the twenty five portfolios. R(-6) is the prior six month return, B/M is the book-to-market ratio of the firm, Roll Spread is the Roll (1984) effective spread, 
Turnover is the stock turnover measured as volume divided by number of shares issued. Panel A presents results for NYSE/AMEX stocks  for the periods 
1960-2008, 1960-2000 and 2001-2008,. Panel B presents results for NASDAQ stocks 1983-2008, 1983-2000 and 2001-2008.  
                                                                       
    Panel A: NYSE/AMEX    
 1960-2008 1960-2000 2001-2008 
 Mean Median St Dev. Mean Median St.Dev. Mean Median St.Dev. 
          
MV 11.7902 11.6484 9.0622 11.5331 11.4030 8.9386 13.2366 13.4205 9.1632 
Volume 0.2151 0.0119 1.2798 0.0766 0.0084 0.3352 1.0094 0.2357 3.1055 
ILLIQ 15.853 12.164 11.821 16.3728 4.3739 33.5605 4.9834 0.0992 26.6680 
ILLIQ_A 14.522 11.278 10.719 15.0506 4.3606 27.8997 4.6536 0.0992 24.7795 
ILLIQ-ILLIQ_A  % Diff  0.0155 0.0000 0.0472 0.0171 0.0000 0.0495 0.0058 0.0000 0.0291 
Iilliq 39.3244 36.0312 
19.9177 41.6758 37.3115 18.3015 31.4562 22.1838 19.1644 
iILLIQ_A 36.3653 33.4604 
15.6462 37.4934 34.3372 15.0290 29.3258 34.1320 18.0117 
βrm 1.0627 1.0636 
0.2077 1.0633 1.0636 0.2077 1.0597 1.0636 0.2078 
βSMB 0.7312 0.7594 
0.4539 0.7323 0.7594 0.4552 0.7260 0.7594 0.4475 
βHML 0.5171 0.5312 
0.1741 0.5173 0.5312 0.1736 0.5160 0.5338 0.1769 
βps 1.0003 1.4856 
2.6065 0.9951 1.4856 2.6121 1.0260 1.4856 2.5781 
βMom -0.098 -0.0983 
0.0736 -0.0989 -0.0988 0.0733 -0.0975 -0.0989 0.0747 
R(-6) 1.2070 0.0000 12.4457 1.2974 0.0000 12.1732 0.6612 4.7707 7.0222 
B/M 2.4350 0.6569 432.32 2.7272 0.6890 462.61 0.4370 0.4997 6.7237 
Roll Spread 0.2940 0.2077 0.3253 0.2941 0.2095 0.3230 0.2932 0.1956 0.3371 
Turnover 2.8834 1.6509 4.1539 2.2253 1.4375 2.9572 6.6526 4.7707 7.0222 
 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics (cont.) 
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This table reports mean, median, standard deviation (St Dev.) values of the following variables.  MV is the logarithm of December market value. Volume is 
daily volume in millions of US dollars. ILLIQ and ILLIQ_A are the illiquidity ratios computed from daily information multiplied by 10
6
. ILLIQ is computed 
using all available data but excluding zero volume days. ILLIQ_A is ILLIQ scaled by scaled by (2T-τ)/2T, where T is the number of possible trading days and τ 
is the number of zero volume days within T. ILLIQ-ILLIQ_A % Diff is the percentage difference between ILLIQ and ILLIQ_A. iILLIQ and iILLIQ_A are the 
inflation adjusted illiquidity ratios,  βrm is the estimated portfolio market beta from the twenty five portfolios, βSMB  is the estimated beta on the Fama-
French SMB factor from the twenty five portfolios, βHML  is the is the estimated beta on the Fama-French HML factor from the twenty five portfolios. βps is 
the beta  on the Pastor-Stambaugh market-wide illiquidity factor from the twenty five portfolios. ΒMom is the beta on the Fama-French Mom factor from 
the twenty five portfolios. R(-6) is the prior six month return, B/M is the book-to-market ratio of the firm, Roll Spread is the Roll (1984) effective spread, 
Turnover is  stock turnover .  Panel A presents results for NYSE/AMEX stocks  for the periods 1960-2008, 1960-2000 and 2001-2008,. Panel B presents 
results for NASDAQ stocks 1983-2008, 1983-2000 and 2001-2008.  
 
    Panel B: NASDAQ    
 1983-2008 1983-2000 2001-2008 
 Mean Median St.Dev. Mean Median St.Dev. Mean Median St. Dev 
             
MV 11.3172 11.2051 8.6534 11.0235 10.9211 8.5274 12.0077 11.9718 8.7420 
Volume 0.2291 0.0220 1.6098 0.0926 0.0156 0.5707 0.6034 0.0893 2.9356 
ILLIQ 20.9403 3.8465 68.0399 22.8572 6.0237 64.0053 15.6836 0.5201 77.8008 
ILLIQ_A 18.0394 3.7207 53.0677 19.1894 5.7466 43.9850 14.8855 0.5201 72.2509 
ILLIQ-ILLIQ_A % Diff 0.0383 0.0000 0.5313 0.0497 0.0020 0.0964 0.0072 0.0000 0.0298 
iILLIQ 111.4275 97.4792 46. 1718 109.1033 97.0031 46.1789 116.3268 83.1957 108. 2604 
iILLIQ_A 96.2081 82.7129 4.6615 91.8300 82.4938 34.3610 111.3506 82.2621 104.3428 
βrm 1.0594 1.0718 0.2749 1.0686 1.0934 0.2740 1.0429 1.0718 0.2756 
βSMB 0.7186 0.7448 0.2125 0.7185 0.7448 0.2113 0.7189 0.7448 0.2147 
βHML 0.3120 0.4031 0.2840 0.3064 0.4031 0.2868 0.3219 0.4391 0.2786 
βps 0.1983 -0.5034 3.2977 0.1838 -0.5034 3.3128 0.2243 -0.5034 3.2703 
βMom -0.1242 -0.0929 0.1078 -0.1268 -0.0932 0.1075 -0.1196 -0.0929 0.1083 
R(-6) 1.0154 0.0000 16.065 1.0684 0.0000 16.371 0.8666 0.0000 20.181 
B/M 0.5718 0.5347 19.232 0.5865 0.5479 21.81 0.5252 0.5025 5.5768 
Roll Spread 0.5275 0.3745 0.5339 0.5716 0.4113 0.5709 0.4004 0.2859 0.3816 
Turnover 5.0391 2.7603 7.6303 4.2951 2.5554 6.1198 7.1312 4.1290 10.520 
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Table 4: Regressions against transactions measures of illiquidity  
 
Panel A presents the estimated coefficients of the regression equation, 
, =  + , + , + ,, 
where ,  is, in turn, I ,, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio, equation (2), I_,, the adjusted illiquidity ratio proposed in equation (11), or the 
difference between the two measures, for all firms with NYSE TAQ data for the period 1993 to 2008. The regressions are run as a panel with both firm and time 
fixed effects. The explanatory variables are λ the Kyle (1985) price impact measure and ψ the fixed-cost component of the spread, and are estimated from 
intraday quotes and transactions using the method of Glosten and Harris (1988).  In Panel B, we calculate a mean difference in the R-squared values from each 
of the regressions for I ,, and I_,, using estimates for each year separately to constitute a sample. We do this for the full sample of all firms, and 
separately by size quintile. In Panel C, we examine the R-squared for regressions for the difference between the two measures, using estimates for each year 
separately to constitute a sample, both for the full sample of firms and for each size quintile. The * implies significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level and *** 
at a 1% level. The figures in parentheses are t-statistics.  
Panel A: Panel Regression Results (all firms, all years) 
 Constant λ (Kyle) ψ (Fixed Cost) R
2
 
 I,  1.425 1.641 10.491 3.35% 
 (45.91)*** (23.41)*** (20.23)***  
I_, 1.394 1.605 10.216 3.37% 
 (46.18)*** (23.54)*** (20.26)***  
I_, − I , -0.031 -0.036 -0.275 0.23% 
 (-11.10)*** (-5.67)*** (-5.81)***  
Panel B: Test of null hypothesis of zero difference between the R
2 
(Ho: ΔR
2
=0 ) for I,  and I_,   
 Quintiles sorted by firm size Full Sample 
 Small 2 3 4 Large  
Average ΔR
2
 0.00243 0.00190 0.00016 0.00007 <0.00001 0.00078 
t-stat (2.21)** (2.54)** (3.33)*** (1.98)* (1.00) (3.12)*** 
Panel C: Test of null hypothesis of zero for the R
2 
(Ho: R
2
=0 ) for I, − I_, 
 Quintiles sorted by firm size Full Sample 
 Small 2 3 4 Large  
Average R
2
 0.04860 0.08086 0.01161 0.03547 0.00822 0.01403 
t-stat (3.81)*** (2.00)* (3.48)*** (1.69)* (1.00) (3.52)*** 
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Table 5: Fama-MacBeth Cross Section Results NYSE/AMEX 1960-2008 
 
Reported estimates are the time series average of coefficients from cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions using 
monthly return data for NYSE/AMEX stocks over the period 1960-2008. Panel A reports results of monthly returns 
regressed on the estimated market beta (βrm) and one of the two illiquidity measures ILLIQMA, or ILLIQMA_A. ILLIQMA has 
been computed as described in Amihud (2002) and omits any zero volume days. ILLIQMA_A is ILLIQMA scaled by (2T-τ)/2T, 
where T is the number of possible trading days and τ is the number of zero volume days within T. The column headed DIF 
reports the time series average of the difference between the cross section coefficients obtained from the regressions 
using each of the two illiquidity measures. Panel B contains estimates where the cross-section model specification also 
includes βps the market-wide illiquidity risk factor, and the estimated betas on the  Fama-French SMB (βSMB), HML (βHML) 
and Mom (βMom) factors. Panel C are the results from the specification that augments the regressions with market value 
(Size), book-to-market value (B/M), and the prior six month return, R(-6). Panel D extends the model further by including 
two alternative measures of liquidity, the Roll (1984) effective spread (Spread) and turnover (Turnover). The * implies 
significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level and *** at a 1% level using Shanken (1992) adjusted t-statistics. Two-Stage are 
the results of the two stage regression in which ILLIQMA_A is regressed against ILLIQMA. Second stage results are 
reported in which these residuals, risk factors and characteristics are regressed against one year ahead returns. In this 
second stage regression the illiquidity variable are the residuals from the first stage regression.    
 
  Panel A Panel B 
  ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage 
Illiquidity 0.168 0.189 -0.021 0.538 0.133 0.156 -0.023 0.287 
  ( 3.89)*** ( 3.90)*** (-3.72)*** ( 2.91)*** ( 4.56)*** ( 4.65)*** (-4.53)*** ( 2.75)*** 
βrm 0.154 0.162 -0.008 -0.037 0.371 0.458 -0.086 -0.252 
 ( 0.49) ( 0.52) (-1.67)* (-0.12) ( 1.17) ( 1.43) (-4.58)*** (-0.78) 
βSMB - - -  -0.025 -0.073 0.048 0.301 
 - - -  (-0.12) (-0.34) (4.63)*** ( 1.36) 
βHML - - -  0.652 0.649 0.002 0.475 
 - - -  (2.87)*** (2.86)*** (0.65) ( 2.15)** 
βps - - -  0.004 0.003 0.000 0.011 
 - - -  (0.36) (0.34) (0.78) ( 1.12) 
βMom     0.012 0.149 -0.136 -0.676 
 - - -  (0.02) (0.28) (-4.60)*** (-1.23) 
 Panel C Panel D 
  ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage 
Illiquidity 0.116 0.126 -0.010 0.310 0.084 0.092 -0.008 0.193 
 ( 3.54)*** ( 3.58)*** (-2.73)*** ( 1.88)* ( 2.88)*** ( 2.93)*** (-2.25)*** ( 1.7)* 
βrm 0.876 0.907 -0.031 0.541 0.831 0.853 -0.023 0.604 
 ( 2.39)** ( 2.46)** (-3.15)*** ( 1.42) ( 2.31)** ( 2.37)*** (-2.44)** ( 1.62) 
βSMB -0.686 -0.694 0.008 -0.654 -0.552 -0.559 0.007 -0.521 
 (-2.77)*** (-2.80)*** ( 2.14)** (-2.55)** (-2.35)** (-2.38)** (-1.70)* (-2.15)** 
βHML 0.506 0.500 0.006 0.431 0.381 0.377 -0.005 0.324 
 ( 2.18)** ( 2.16)*** (-2.21)** ( 1.8)* ( 1.74)* ( 1.73)* (-1.68)* ( 1.43) 
βps -0.010 -0.010 0.000 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.0000 -0.006 
 ( -0.92) ( 0.91) (-1.45) (-0.68) (-0.77) (-0.76) (-1.17) (-0.59) 
βMom 0.185 0.255 -0.069 -0.382 0.118 0.172 -0.053 -0.277 
 (0.34) (0.47) (-3.60)*** (-0.67) (-0.22) (-0.32) (-2.94)*** (-0.5) 
Size -0.175 -0.171 -0.004 -0.227 -0.161 -0.159 -0.002 -0.193 
 (-2.8)*** (-2.76)*** (-2.83)*** (-3.39)*** (-2.69)*** (-2.67)*** (-1.64) (-3.11)*** 
R(-6) 1.177 1.178 -0.004 1.205 1.227 1.227 0.000 1.244 
 (3.87)*** (3.88)*** (-0.23) ( 3.74)*** (4.22)*** (4.23)*** (0.02) ( 4.11)*** 
B/M 0.047 0.047 0.000 0.058 0.031 0.030 0.000 0.036 
 (0.78) (0.78) (0.33) ( 0.9) (0.53) (0.53) (0.37) ( 0.61) 
Spread     0.044 0.040 0.004 0.069 
     (1.00) (0.91) (3.40)*** ( 1.45) 
Turnover     -0.052 -0.050 -0.002 -0.064 
     (-2.52)** (-2.45)** (-2.13)** (-2.84)*** 
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Table 6: Fama-MacBeth Cross-Section Results NASDAQ 1983-2008 
Reported estimates are the time series average of coefficients from cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions using monthly return 
data for NASDAQ stocks over the period 1983-2008. Panel A reports results of monthly returns regressed on the estimated market 
beta (βrm) and one of the two illiquidity measures ILLIQMA, or ILLIQMA_A. ILLIQMA has been computed as described in Amihud 
(2002) and omits any zero volume days. ILLIQMA_A is ILLIQMA scaled by (2T-τ)/2T, where T is the number of possible trading days 
and τ is the number of zero volume days within T. The column headed DIF reports the time series average of the difference between 
the cross section coefficients obtained from the regressions using each of the two illiquidity measures. Panel B contains estimates 
where the cross-section model specification also includes βps the market-wide illiquidity risk factor, and the estimated betas on the 
Fama-French SMB (βSMB), HML (βHML) and Mom (βMom) factors. Panel C are the results from the specification that augments the 
regressions with market value (Size), book-to-market value (B/M), and the prior six month return, R(-6). Panel D extends the model 
further by including two alternative measures of liquidity, the Roll (1984) effective spread (Spread) and turnover (Turnover).. The * 
implies significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level and *** at a 1% level using Shanken (1992) adjusted t-statistics. N is the number 
of firm months in the sample. Two-Stage are the results of the two stage regression in which ILLIQMA_A is regressed against 
ILLIQMA. Second stage results are reported in which these residuals, risk factors and characteristics are regressed against one year 
ahead returns. In this second stage regression the illiquidity variable are the residuals from the first stage regression.   
 
 Panel A Panel B 
  ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage 
Illiquidity 0.140 0.165 -0.025 0.654 0.117 0.138 -0.021 0.543 
 ( 4.21)*** ( 4.52)*** (-3.71)*** ( 3.1)*** ( 3.05)*** ( 3.26)*** (-2.88)*** ( 2.96)*** 
βrm 0.361 0.411 -0.050 0.165 0.533 0.572 -0.038 0.396 
 ( 0.79) ( 0.90) (-4.16)*** ( 0.35) ( 1.48) ( 1.60) (-3.01)*** ( 1.09) 
βSMB  -  -  -  -0.111 0.066 0.045 0.147 
  -  -  -  (0.22) (0.13) (3.42)*** ( 0.3) 
βHML  -  -  -  0.532 0.537 -0.005 0.488 
  -  -  -  (1.28) (1.28) (-1.72)* ( 1.21) 
βps  -  -  -  0.044 0.040 0.004 0.062 
  -  -  -  ( 2.14)** ( 1.95)* ( 3.37)*** ( 3.47)*** 
Size  -  -  -   -1.667 -1.659 -0.008 -1.775 
  -  -  -   (-1.75)*  (-1.74)*  (-0.67) (-1.87)* 
  Panel C Panel D 
  ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage 
Illiquidity 0.072 0.083 -0.012 0.611 0.033 0.041 -0.008 0.457 
 ( 1.88)* ( 2.02)** (-2.55)** ( 2.5)** ( 1.3) ( 1.63) (-1.7)* ( 1.99)** 
βrm 1.285 1.294 -0.009 1.272 1.338 1.341 -0.002 1.352 
 ( 3.33)*** ( 3.38)*** ( -1.71)* ( 3.12)*** ( 3.67)*** ( 3.7)*** (-0.53) ( 3.55)*** 
βSMB -1.771 -1.764 -0.007 -1.862 -1.674 -1.670 -0.004 -1.725 
 (-4.01)*** (-4.01)*** (-1.55) (-4.06)*** (-4.14)*** (-4.14)*** (-0.89) (-4.19)*** 
βHML 0.987 0.981 0.006 1.000 0.888 0.884 0.004 0.896 
 ( 2.75)*** ( 2.75)*** ( 2.33)** ( 2.72)*** ( 2.73)*** ( 2.73)*** ( 1.69)* ( 2.74)*** 
βps -0.021 -0.022 0.001 -0.017 -0.011 -0.012 0.001 -0.010 
 (-0.94) (-0.99) (2.52)** (-0.75) (-0.58) (-0.63) ( 1.96)* (-0.49) 
βMom -2.278 -2.258 -0.020 -2.380 -2.267 -2.255 -0.012 -2.298 
 (-2.71)*** (-2.71)*** (-1.87)* (-2.75)*** (-2.74)*** (-2.73)*** (-1.17) (-2.71)*** 
Size -0.310 -0.304 -0.006 -0.331 -0.260 -0.259 -0.002 -0.268 
 (-2.84)*** (-2.8)*** (-3.01)*** (-3.14)*** (-2.63)*** (-2.62)*** (-1.66)* (-2.76)*** 
R (-6) 0.848 0.847 0.001 0.838 0.753 0.752 0.001 0.736 
 ( 2.36)** ( 2.37)** ( 0.41) ( 2.24)** ( 2.18)** ( 2.19)** ( 0.35) ( 2.09)** 
B/M 0.082 0.080 0.001 0.095 0.078 0.078 0.001 0.086 
 ( 0.82) ( 0.82) (0.99) ( 0.89) ( 0.85) ( 0.85) ( 0.55) ( 0.88) 
Spread     0.112 0.105 0.007 0.116 
     ( 1.44) ( 1.33) ( 1.72)* ( 1.78)* 
Turnover     -0.027 -0.026 -0.001 -0.030 
     (-1.98)** (-1.93)* (-2.11)** (-1.99)** 
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Table 7: Fama-MacBeth Cross-Section Results NYSE/AMEX 1960-2000 
Reported estimates are the time series average of coefficients from cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions 1960-2000. Panel A reports 
results of monthly returns regressed on the estimated market beta (βrm) and one of the two illiquidity measures ILLIQMA, or ILLIQMA_A. 
ILLIQMA has been computed as described in Amihud (2002) and omits any zero volume days. ILLIQMA_A is ILLIQMA scaled by (2T-τ)/2T, 
where T is the number of possible trading days and τ is the number of zero volume days within T. The column headed DIF reports the time 
series average of the difference between the cross section coefficients obtained from the regressions using each of the two illiquidity 
measures. Panel B contains estimates where the cross-section model specification also includes βps the market-wide illiquidity risk factor, 
and the estimated betas on the  Fama-French SMB (βSMB), HML (βHML) and Mom (βMom) factors. Panel C are the results from the specification 
that augments the regressions with market value (Size), book-to-market value (B/M), and the prior six month return, R(-6). Panel D extends 
the model further by including two alternative measures of liquidity, the Roll (1984) effective spread (Spread) and turnover (Turnover). The 
* implies significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level and *** at a 1% level using Shanken (1992) adjusted t-statistics. N is the number of firm 
months in the sample. Two-Stage are the results of the two stage regression in which ILLIQMA_A is regressed against ILLIQMA. Second stage 
results are reported in which these residuals, risk factors and characteristics are regressed against one year ahead returns. In this second 
stage regression the illiquidity variable are the residuals from the first stage regression.   
 
  Panel A Panel B 
  ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage 
Illiquidity 0.179 0.201 -0.022 0.533 0.144 0.168 -0.024 0.262 
  ( 3.59)*** ( 3.60)*** (-3.42)*** ( 2.54)** ( 4.28)*** ( 4.36)*** (-4.22)*** ( 2.28)** 
βrm 0.111 0.119 -0.008 -0.083 0.461 0.546 -0.085 -0.197 
  ( 0.33) ( 0.35) (-1.35) (-0.25) ( 1.31) ( 1.54) (-4.20)*** (-0.55) 
βSMB        -0.095  -0.145  0.049  0.251 
          (-0.40)  (-0.61) (4.28)***  ( 1.02) 
βHML         0.703  0.702 0.001  0.526 
          (2.92)*** (2.91)***  (0.24)  ( 2.26)** 
βps        0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 
         ( -0.01) ( -0.02) ( 0.94) ( 0.71) 
Size        0.286 0.411 -0.125 -0.448 
         (0.50) (0.72) (-4.22)*** (-0.76) 
            
  Panel  C Panel D 
  ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage 
Illiquidity 0.123 0.133 -0.011 0.151 0.087 0.096 -0.008 0.036 
 ( 3.24)*** (3.28)*** (-2.5)** ( 1.73)* ( 2.57)*** ( 2.62)*** (-1.99)** ( 1.72)* 
βrm 1.000 1.032 -0.031 0.645 0.938 0.960 -0.022 0.702 
 ( 2.51)** (2.57)*** (-2.75)*** ( 1.54) ( 2.36)** ( 2.41)** (-2.02)** ( 1.7)* 
βSMB -0.819 -0.829 0.010 -0.773 -0.650 -0.659 0.009 -0.607 
 (-2.98)*** (-3.01)*** ( 2.36)** (-2.69)*** (-2.49)** (-2.52)** ( 1.93)* (-2.24)** 
βHML 0.513 0.508 0.005 0.446 0.351 0.347 0.004 0.304 
 ( 2.01)** ( 2.)** ( 1.71)* ( 1.68)* ( 1.47) ( 1.46) ( 1.21) ( 1.23) 
βps -0.014 -0.013 0.000 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 0.000 -0.011 
 (-1.25) (-1.24) (-1.23) (-1.03) (-1.14) (-1.13) (-1.07) (-1.) 
βMom 0.484 0.547 -0.063 -0.117 0.372 0.417 -0.045 -0.040 
 ( 0.85) ( 0.96) (-3.01)*** (-0.19) ( 0.65) ( 0.73) (-2.28)** (-0.07) 
Size -0.192 -0.188 -0.003 -0.244 -0.181 -0.179 -0.001 -0.211 
 (-2.8)*** (-2.77)*** (-2.34)** (-3.31)*** (-2.76)*** (-2.74)*** (-1.06) (-3.11)*** 
R(-6) 1.107 1.108 -0.001 1.134 1.168 1.168 0.000 1.183 
 ( 3.36)*** (3.38)*** (-0.4) ( 3.23)*** ( 3.73)*** ( 3.74)*** (-0.13) ( 3.61)*** 
B/M 0.071 0.071 0.000 0.083 0.049 0.049 0.000 0.055 
 ( 1.05) ( 1.05) ( 0.46) ( 1.15) ( 0.76) ( 0.76) ( 0.5) ( 0.82) 
Spread     0.016 0.011 0.004 0.042 
     ( 0.33) ( 0.24) ( 3.01)*** ( 0.82) 
Turnover     -0.059 -0.058 -0.002 -0.073 
     (-2.47)** (-2.41)** (-2.04)** (-2.77)*** 
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Table 8: Fama-MacBeth Cross-Section Results NYSE/AMEX 2001-2008 
Reported estimates are the time series average of coefficients from cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions using monthly return data 
for NYSE/AMEX stocks over the period 2001-2008. Panel A reports results of monthly returns regressed on the estimated market beta 
(βrm) and one of the two illiquidity measures ILLIQMA, or ILLIQMA_A. ILLIQMA has been computed as described in Amihud (2002) and 
omits any zero volume days. ILLIQMA_A is ILLIQMA scaled by (2T-τ)/2T, where T is the number of possible trading days and τ is the 
number of zero volume days within T. The column headed DIF reports the time series average of the difference between the cross section 
coefficients obtained from the regressions using each of the two illiquidity measures. Panel B contains estimates where the cross-section 
model specification also includes βps the market-wide illiquidity risk factor, and the estimated betas on the  Fama-French SMB (βSMB), 
HML (βHML) and Mom (βMom) factors. Panel C are the results from the specification that augments the regressions with market value (Size), 
book-to-market value (B/M), and the prior six month return, R(-6). Panel D extends the model further by including two alternative 
measures of liquidity, the Roll (1984) effective spread (Spread) and turnover (Turnover). The * implies significance at a 10% level, ** at a 
5% level and *** at a 1% level using Shanken (1992) adjusted t-statistics. Two-Stage are the results of the two stage regression in which 
ILLIQMA_A is regressed against ILLIQMA. Second stage results are reported in which these residuals, risk factors and characteristics are 
regressed against one year ahead returns. In this second stage regression the illiquidity variable are the residuals from the first stage 
regression.   
 
  Panel A Panel B 
  ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage 
IIliquidity 0.102 0.118 -0.015 0.566 0.071 0.085 -0.015 0.433 
  ( 2.23)** ( 2.18)** (-1.75)* ( 1.97)** ( 2.15)** ( 2.19)** (-1.88)* ( 1.98)** 
βrm 0.412 0.425 -0.012 0.244 -0.167 -0.072 -0.095 -0.581 
  ( 0.48) ( 0.49) (-1.47) ( 0.3) ( -0.24) ( -0.10) (-1.82)* (-0.86) 
βSMB         0.397 0.355  0.042  0.604 
          (0.84)  (0.77) (1.76)*  ( 1.3) 
βHML         0.346 0.335  0.011  0.165 
          (0.47) (0.46)  (1.44)  ( 0.23) 
βps        0.026 0.026 0.000 0.036 
         ( 0. 70) ( 0. 70) (-0.31) ( 1.02) 
Size        -1.631 -1.423 -0.207 -2.048 
         (-1.09) (-0.97) (-1.93)* (-1.42) 
N  125549      125549    
 Panel C Panel D 
  ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage 
Illiquidity 0.075 0.081 -0.006 1.261 0.067 0.073 -0.007 1.134 
 ( 2.05)** ( 2.13)** (-1.88)* ( 2.48)** ( 1.9)* ( 2.)** (-2.00)** ( 2.27)** 
βrm 0.129 0.161 -0.031 -0.080 0.185 0.215 -0.030 0.013 
 ( 0.14) ( 0.17) (-2.16)** (-0.09) ( 0.22) ( 0.25) (-2.19)** ( 0.02) 
βSMB 0.111 0.116 -0.005 0.063 0.039 0.045 -0.006 -0.005 
 ( 0.21) ( 0.22) (-2.04)** ( 0.11) ( 0.08) ( 0.09) (-2.28)** (-0.01) 
βHML 0.466 0.455 0.012 0.341 0.564 0.554 0.010 0.441 
 ( 0.75) ( 0.73) ( 1.79)* ( 0.54) ( 0.94) ( 0.92) ( 1.78)* ( 0.73) 
βps 0.012 0.013 0.000 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.000 0.024 
 ( 0.34) ( 0.35) (-1.) ( 0.52) ( 0.5) ( 0.51) (-0.48) ( 0.69) 
βMom -1.604 -1.495 -0.109 -1.972 -1.404 -1.300 -0.104 -1.698 
 (-1.04) (-0.98) (-2.18)** (-1.23) (-0.93) (-0.87) (-2.24)** (-1.1) 
Size -0.073 -0.068 -0.005 -0.123 -0.043 -0.038 -0.004 -0.084 
 (-0.48) (-0.45) (-2.18)** (-0.76) (-0.29) (-0.26) (-2.28)** (-0.55) 
R(-6) 1.598 1.595 0.003 1.632 1.584 1.582 0.002 1.609 
 ( 1.99)** ( 1.98)** ( 0.77) ( 2.)** ( 2.01)** ( 2.01)** ( 0.66) ( 2.)** 
B/M -0.099 -0.098 0.000 -0.096 -0.080 -0.080 0.000 -0.077 
 (-0.81) (-0.81) (-1.08) (-0.78) (-0.71) (-0.71) (-1.) (-0.67) 
Spread        0.216 0.212 0.004 0.232 
        ( 1.78)* ( 1.75)* ( 2.22)** ( 1.89)* 
Turnover        -0.007 -0.007 0.000 -0.010 
        (-0.55) (-0.52) (-2.21)** (-0.71) 
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Table 9: Fama-MacBeth Cross Section Results NASDAQ 1983-2000 
Reported estimates are the time series average of coefficients from cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions using monthly 
return data for NASDAQ stocks over the period 1983-2000. Panel A reports results of monthly returns regressed on the 
estimated market beta (βrm) and one of the two illiquidity measures ILLIQMA, or ILLIQMA_A. ILLIQMA has been computed as 
described in Amihud (2002) and omits any zero volume days. ILLIQMA_A is ILLIQMA scaled by (2T-τ)/2T, where T is the number 
of possible trading days and τ is the number of zero volume days within T. The column headed DIF reports the time series 
average of the difference between the cross section coefficients obtained from the regressions using each of the two illiquidity 
measures. Panel B contains estimates where the cross-section model specification also includes βps the market-wide illiquidity 
risk factor, and the estimated betas on the  Fama-French SMB (βSMB), HML (βHML) and Mom (βMom) factors. Panel C are the 
results from the specification that augments the regressions with market value (Size), book-to-market value (B/M), and the 
prior six month return R(-6). Panel D extends the model further by including two alternative measures of liquidity, the Roll 
(1984) effective spread (Spread) and turnover (Turnover). The * implies significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level and *** at 
a 1% level using Shanken (1992) adjusted t-statistics. Two-Stage are the results of the two stage regression in which 
ILLIQMA_A is regressed against ILLIQMA. Second stage results are reported in which these residuals, risk factors and 
characteristics are regressed against one year ahead returns. In this second stage regression the illiquidity variable are the 
residuals from the first stage regression.   
 
  Panel A Panel B 
  ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage 
Illiquidity 0.147 0.173 -0.026 0.614 0.133 0.156 -0.023 0.547 
  ( 3.42)** ( 3.72)*** (-3.08)** ( 2.25)** ( 2.63)*** ( 2.80)*** (-2.41)** ( 2.28)** 
βrm 0.272 0.327 -0.055 0.072 0.516 0.561 -0.045 0.353 
  ( 0.52) ( 0.63) (-3.58)*** ( 0.13) ( 1.24) ( 1.36) (-2.67)*** ( 0.83) 
βSMB         0.34 -0.017  0.051  0.079 
          (0.05) (-0.03)  (3.00)***  ( 0.13) 
βHML         0.540 0.547  -0.007  0.482 
          (1.04) (1.05)  (-1.95)*  ( 0.96) 
βps        0.035 0.031 0.003 0.053 
         ( 1.36) ( 1.21) ( 2.64)*** ( 2.42)** 
Size        -1.419 -1.424 0.005 -1.519 
         (-1.21) (-1.21) (0.39) (-1.29) 
            
  Panel C Panel D 
  ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage 
Illiquidity 0.080 0.093 -0.013 0.606 0.033 0.041 -0.008 0.410 
 ( 1.38) ( 1.56) (-2.05)** ( 2.77)*** ( 1.05) ( 1.49) (-1.43) ( 1.93)* 
βrm 1.417 1.429 -0.011 1.401 1.524 1.525 -0.002 1.540 
 ( 3.1)*** ( 3.16)*** (-1.47) ( 2.85)*** ( 3.49)*** (3.52)*** (-0.29) ( 3.37)*** 
βSMB -2.106 -2.100 -0.006 -2.195 -1.997 -1.995 -0.002 -2.034 
 (-3.57)*** (-3.59)*** (-0.96) (-3.56)*** (3.76)*** (-3.77)*** (-0.35) (-3.77)*** 
βHML 1.061 1.055 0.006 1.069 0.918 0.915 0.003 0.922 
 ( 2.16)** ( 2.17)** ( 1.78)* ( 2.11)** ( 2.12)** ( 2.13)** ( 1.26) ( 2.13)** 
βps -0.038 -0.039 0.001 -0.035 -0.026 -0.027 0.001 -0.026 
 (-1.27) (-1.32) ( 1.76)* (-1.16) (-1.01) (-1.05) ( 1.35) (-0.97) 
βMom -2.172 -2.155 -0.017 -2.247 -2.145 -2.137 -0.008 -2.141 
 (-2.)** (-2.)** (-1.22) (-1.98)** (-2.)** (-2.01)** (-0.58) (-1.95)* 
Size -0.356 -0.349 -0.007 -0.377 -0.296 -0.295 -0.001 -0.302 
 (-2.41)** (-2.38)** (-2.5)** (-2.64)*** (-2.23)** (-2.22)** (-1.13) (-2.32)** 
R(-6) 0.678 0.677 0.000 0.656 0.565 0.565 0.000 0.534 
 ( 1.55) ( 1.57) ( 0.12) ( 1.43) ( 1.38) ( 1.39) ( 0.) ( 1.27) 
B/M 0.076 0.074 0.001 0.090 0.067 0.066 0.001 0.074 
 ( 0.55) ( 0.55) ( 0.81) ( 0.6) ( 0.54) ( 0.54) ( 0.4) ( 0.56) 
Spread        0.110 0.102 0.008 0.111 
        ( 1.08) ( 0.98) ( 1.44) ( 1.31) 
Turnover        -0.038 -0.036 -0.001 -0.041 
        (-1.93)* (-1.89)* (-1.96)* (-1.93)* 
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Table 10: Fama-MacBeth Cross-Section Results NASDAQ 2001-2008 
Reported estimates are the time series average of coefficients from cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions using monthly 
return data for NASDAQ stocks over the period 2001-2008. Panel A reports results of monthly returns regressed on the estimated 
market beta (βrm) and one of the two illiquidity measures ILLIQMA, or ILLIQMA_A. ILLIQMA has been computed as described in 
Amihud (2002) and omits any zero volume days. ILLIQMA_A is ILLIQMA scaled by (2T-τ)/2T, where T is the number of possible 
trading days and τ is the number of zero volume days within T. The column headed DIF reports the time series average of the 
difference between the cross section coefficients obtained from the regressions using each of the two illiquidity measures. Panel 
B contains estimates where the cross-section model specification also includes βps the market-wide illiquidity risk factor, and the 
estimated betas on the Fama-French SMB (βSMB), HML (βHML) and Mom (βMom) factors. Panel C are the results from the 
specification that augments the regressions with market value (Size), book-to-market value (B/M), and the six month return, R(-6). 
Panel D extends the model further by including two alternative measures of liquidity, the Roll (1984) effective spread (Spread) and 
turnover (Turnover). The * implies significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level and *** at a 1% level using Shanken (1992) 
adjusted t-statistics. Two-Stage are the results of the two stage regression in which ILLIQMA_A is regressed against ILLIQMA. 
Second stage results are reported in which these residuals, risk factors and characteristics are regressed against one year ahead 
returns. In this second stage regression the illiquidity variable are the residuals from the first stage regression.   
 Panel A Panel B 
  ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage 
Illiquidity 0.123 0.145 -0.022 0.761 0.076 0.092 -0.016 0.532 
  ( 2.64)*** ( 2.60)*** (-2.10)** ( 2.5)** ( 2.07)** ( 2.26)** (-2.20)** ( 2.47)** 
βrm 0.599 0.637 -0.038 0.413 0.580 0.601 -0.021 0.513 
  ( 0.62) ( 0.65) (-2.18)** ( 0.44) ( 0.77) ( 0.80) (-2.27)** ( 0.68) 
βSMB         0.317 0.288  0.029  0.329 
          (0.35) (0.32)  (2.11)**  ( 0.38) 
βHML         0.512 0.510  0.002  0.503 
          (0.72) (0.71)  (0.57)  ( 0.73) 
βps        0.069 0.065 0.004 0.088 
         ( 2.09)** ( 2.03)** ( 2.26)** ( 2.71)*** 
Size        -2.326 -2.284 -0.043 -2.456 
     (-1.49) (-1.46) (-1.56) (-1.6) 
           
  Panel C Panel D 
  ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage ILLIQMA ILLIQMA_A DIF Two-Stage 
Illiquidity 0.049 0.057 -0.008 0.622 0.035 0.041 -0.006 0.581 
 ( 1.81)* (2.13)** (-1.85)* ( 2.45)** (0.97) (1.35) (-1.31) ( 2.36)** 
βrm 0.932 0.935 -0.003 0.927 0.845 0.849 -0.004 0.849 
 ( 1.17) (1.17) (-1.72)* ( 1.14) (1.15) (1.15) (-1.68)* ( 1.12) 
βSMB -0.879 -0.870 -0.010 -0.975 -0.813 -0.804 -0.008 -0.900 
 (-1.58) (-1.56) (-1.92)* (-1.73)* (-1.53) (-1.52) (-1.75)* (-1.67)* 
βHML 0.791 0.784 0.006 0.818 0.808 0.802 0.005 0.826 
 ( 1.52) (1.51) (1.38) ( 1.56) (1.58) (1.57) (1.04) ( 1.59) 
βps 0.025 0.024 0.001 0.033 0.028 0.027 0.001 0.033 
 ( 0.92) ( 0.87) ( 2.16)** ( 1.12) ( 1.02) ( 0.99) ( 1.72)* ( 1.11) 
βMom -2.560 -2.533 -0.028 -2.735 -2.594 -2.571 -0.023 -2.719 
 (-1.94)* (-1.91)* (-1.7)* (-2.03)** (-2.02)** (-2.)** (-1.44) (-2.06)** 
Size -0.190 -0.187 -0.003 -0.208 -0.165 -0.163 -0.002 -0.176 
 (-1.3) (-1.28) (-1.82)* (-1.49) (-1.25) (-1.23) (-1.37) (-1.39) 
R(-6) 1.302 1.299 0.003 1.322 1.254 1.251 0.003 1.275 
 ( 1.94)* ( 1.94)* ( 1.59) ( 1.95)* ( 1.9)* ( 1.9)* ( 1.38) ( 1.91)* 
B/M 0.097 0.097 0.001 0.106 0.108 0.107 0.001 0.117 
 ( 0.85) ( 0.85) ( 1.86)* ( 0.9) ( 0.97) ( 0.97) ( 1.51) ( 1.01) 
Spread        0.117 0.114 0.003 0.130 
        ( 01.) ( 0.96) ( 1.16) ( 1.28) 
Turnover        0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
        ( 0.04) ( 0.05) (-1.27) (-0.02) 
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Table 11: Fama-MacBeth Cross-Section Results using √ILLIQMA, NYSE/AMEX 1960-2008 
Reported estimates are the time series averages of coefficients from cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions using monthly 
return data for NYSE/AMEX stocks over the period 1960-2008. Panel A reports results of monthly returns regressed on the 
estimated market beta (βrm) and one of the two illiquidity measures √ILLIQMA, or √ILLIQMA_A. √ILLIQMA has been computed as 
described by Hasbrouck (2009). √ILLIQMA_A is √ILLIQMA scaled by (√T+√(T-τ))/2√T, where T is the number of possible trading 
days and τ is the number of zero volume days within T. The column headed DIF reports the time series average of the difference 
between the cross section coefficients obtained from the regressions using each of the two illiquidity measures. Panel B 
contains estimates where the cross-section model specification also includes βps the market-wide illiquidity risk factor, and the 
estimated betas on the  Fama-French SMB (βSMB), HML (βHML) and Mom (βMom) factors. Panel C are the results from the 
specification that augments the regressions with market value (Size), book-to-market value (B/M), and the six month return, R(-
6). Panel D extends the model further by including two alternative measures of liquidity, the Roll (1984) effective spread 
(Spread) and turnover (Turnover). The * implies significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level and *** at a 1% level using Shanken 
(1992) adjusted t-statistics. N is the number of firm months in the sample. 
 
  Panel A   Panel B  
  √ILLIQMA √ILLIQMA_A DIF √ILLIQMA √ILLIQMA_A DIF 
Illiquidity 0.357 0.377 -0.021 0.367 0.400 -0.033 
  ( 3.85)*** ( 3.85)*** (-3.51)*** ( 5.21)*** ( 5.33)*** (-3.20)*** 
βrm 0.225 0.223 0.002 0.725 0.772 -0.047 
  ( 0.7) ( 0.7) ( 0.59) ( 2.24) ( 2.38) (-3.22) 
βSMB  -  -  -  -0.309 -0.348  0.038  
   -  -  -  (-1.32) (-1.49)  (4.37)  
βHML  -  -  -  0.708 0.697  0.011  
   -  -  -  (3.01)*** (2.96)***  (2.63)***  
βps  -  -  - -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
   -  -  - ( -0.09) ( -0.08) (-0.96)*** 
Size  -  -  -  0.193 0.250  -0.057  
   -  -  -  (0.36) (0.46)  (-2.82)***  
         
     Panel C    Panel D  
  √ILLIQMA √ILLIQMA_A DIF √ILLIQMA √ILLIQMA_A DIF 
Illiquidity 0.287 0.298 -0.011 0.189 0.195 -0.006 
 ( 3.67)*** (3.7)*** (-2.32)**  2.56)*** ( 2.54)** (-1.79)* 
βrm 1.038 1.048 -0.010 0.927 0.933 -0.006 
 ( 2.94)*** ( 2.97)*** (-1.15) (2.67)*** (2.69)*** (-0.72) 
βSMB -0.776 -0.785 0.008 -0.624 -0.631 0.007 
 (-3.1)*** (-3.13)*** ( 2.91)*** (-2.65) (-2.68)** ( 1.73)* 
βHML 0.531 0.524 0.007 0.412 0.408 0.004 
 ( 2.3)** ( 2.27)** ( 2.38)** ( 1.9)* ( 1.89)* ( 1.21) 
βps -0.012 -0.012 0.000 -0.010 -0.010 0.000 
 (-1.15) (-1.14) (-1.69)* (-0.95) (-0.94) (-1.15) 
βMom 0.273 0.289 -0.016 0.183 0.196 -0.013 
 ( 0.51) ( 0.54) (-1.06) ( 0.35) ( 0.37) (-0.85) 
Size -0.147 -0.146 -0.001 -0.146 -0.146 0.000 
 (-2.24)** (-2.22)** (-1.2) (-2.32)** (-2.31)** (-0.05) 
R(-6) 1.170 1.173 -0.002 1.219 1.220 -0.002 
 ( 3.93)*** ( 3.94)*** (-1.02) (4.25)*** (4.26)*** (-0.74) 
B/M 0.045 0.045 0.000 0.028 0.028 0.000 
 ( 0.74) ( 0.74) ( 0.18) ( 0.5) ( 0.49) ( 1.05) 
Spread       0.045 0.043 0.002 
       ( 1.01) ( 0.97) (2.95)*** 
Turnover       -0.047 -0.046 -0.001 
    (-2.22)** (-2.17)** (-0.9) 
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Table 12: Fama-MacBeth Cross-Section Results using √ILLIQMA, NASDAQ 1983-2008 
Reported estimates are the time series averages of coefficients from cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions using monthly return 
data for NASDAQ securities over the period 1983-2008. Panel A reports results of monthly returns regressed on the estimated market 
beta (βrm) and one of the two illiquidity measures √ILLIQMA, or √ILLIQMA_A. √ILLIQMA has been computed as described by 
Hasbrouck (2009). √ILLIQMA_A is √ILLIQMA scaled by (√T+√(T-τ))/2√T, where T is the number of possible trading days and τ is the 
number of zero volume days within T. The column headed DIF reports the time series average of the difference between the cross 
section coefficients obtained from the regressions using each of the two illiquidity measures. Panel B contains estimates where the 
cross-section model specification also includes βps the market-wide illiquidity risk factor, and the estimated betas on the  Fama-French 
SMB (βSMB), HML (βHML) and Mom (βMom) factors. Panel C are the results from the specification that augments the regressions with 
market value (Size), book-to-market value (B/M), and the six month return R(-6). Panel D extends the model further by including two 
alternative measures of liquidity, the Roll (1984) effective spread (Spread) and turnover (Turnover). The * implies significance at a 
10% level, ** at a 5% level and *** at a 1% level using Shanken (1992) adjusted t-statistics. N is the number of firm months in the 
sample. 
 
     Panel A    Panel B  
  √ILLIQMA √ILLIQMA_A DIF √ILLIQMA √ILLIQMA_A DIF 
Illiquidity 0.341 0.369 -0.028 0.316 0.349 -0.032 
  ( 4.63)*** ( 4.68)*** (-3.47)*** ( 3.03)*** ( 3.12)*** (-3.05)*** 
βrm 0.604 0.635 -0.030 0.786 0.824 -0.038 
  ( 1.34) ( 1.40) (-3.21)*** ( 2.17)** ( 2.26)** (-3.01)*** 
βSMB  -  -  -  -0.156 -0.216  0.060  
   -  -  -  (-0.27) (-0.37)  (3.53) *** 
βHML  -  -  -  0.613 0.619  -0.006  
   -  -  -  (1.37) (1.38)  (-1.99)**  
βps  -  -  - 0.030 0.028 0.002 
   -  -  - ( 1.26) ( 1.17) ( 2.49)** 
Size  -  -  - -1.789 -1.814 0.025 
   -  -  - (-1.82)* (-1.84)* (2.87)*** 
         
     Panel C    Panel D  
  √ILLIQMA √ILLIQMA_A DIF √ILLIQMA √ILLIQMA_A DIF 
Illiquidity 0.169 0.183 -0.014 0.067 0.078 -0.010 
 ( 1.81)* ( 1.92)* (-2.81)*** ( 0.7) ( 0.78) (-1.88)* 
βrm 1.345 1.356 -0.011 1.337 1.342 -0.005 
 ( 3.77)*** ( 3.82)*** (-2.21)** ( 3.9)*** (3.93)*** (-1.02) 
βSMB -1.781 -1.785 0.004 -1.677 -1.679 0.001 
 (-4.1)*** (-4.12)*** ( 0.7) (-4.17)*** (-4.18)*** ( 0.24) 
βHML 0.989 0.986 0.003 0.890 0.889 0.001 
 ( 2.78)*** ( 2.78)*** ( 1.66)* (2.69)*** (2.69)*** ( 0.85) 
βps -0.021 -0.022 0.000 -0.011 -0.012 0.000 
 (-0.99) (-1.01) ( 1.14) (-0.59) (-0.62) ( 1.65) 
βMom -2.285 -2.283 -0.003 -2.277 -2.272 -0.005 
 (-2.78)*** (-2.79)*** (-0.43) (-2.76)*** (-2.77)*** (-0.84) 
Size -0.290 -0.285 -0.005 -0.255 -0.253 -0.002 
 (-2.5)** (-2.46)** (-2.8)*** (-2.42)** (-2.41)** (-1.73)* 
R(-6) 0.844 0.841 0.003 0.756 0.753 0.002 
 ( 2.43)** ( 2.44)** ( 1.74)* ( 2.23)** ( 2.23)** ( 1.54) 
B/M 0.076 0.076 0.000 0.077 0.077 0.000 
 ( 0.82) ( 0.82) ( 0.61) ( 0.88) ( 0.88) ( 0.29) 
Spread       0.109 0.104 0.004 
       ( 1.26) ( 1.2) ( 1.57) 
Turnover       -0.023 -0.022 -0.001 
       (-1.79)* (-1.74)* (-2.02)** 
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Figure 1 
 
Figure 1: The ratio of the observed illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ) for a stock (in the presence of thin trading) to the 
unobserved illiquidity ratio (when there is no thin trading) is plotted against the probability of non-trading. The 
unobserved illiquidity ratio is the Amihud (2002) measure applied to 100,000 simulated stock returns, with 
annualized expected return and standard deviation of 8 percent and 20 percent, respectively, and 100,000 
corresponding volume data. The observed illiquidity ratio for a given non-trading probability is obtained from 
“observed” returns and volume data that stochastically include non-trading days, in proportion to the non-trading 
probability, into the simulated data. The observed ratio on a non-trading day is excluded in the annual average 
calculation.  
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Figure 2 
 
                            
Figure 2: The ratio of the observed illiquidity ratio (ILLIQO) for a stock (in the presence of thin trading) to the 
unobserved illiquidity ratio (when there is no thin trading) is plotted against the probability of non-trading. The 
unobserved illiquidity ratio is the Amihud (2002) measure applied to 100,000 simulated stock returns, with 
annualized expected return and standard deviation of 8 percent and 20 percent, respectively, and 100,000 
corresponding volume data. The observed illiquidity ratio for a given non-trading probability is obtained from 
“observed” returns and volume data that stochastically include non-trading days, in proportion to the non-
trading probability, into the simulated data. The observed ratio on a non-trading day is set to zero, and is 
included in the annual average calculation.  
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Figure 3 
 
  
Figure 3: The ratio of the observed adjusted illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ_A) for a stock (in the presence of thin 
trading) to the unobserved illiquidity ratio (when there is no thin trading) is plotted against the probability of 
non-trading. The unobserved illiquidity ratio is the Amihud (2002) measure applied to 100,000 simulated stock 
returns, with annualized expected return and standard deviation of 8 percent and 20 percent, respectively, and 
100,000 corresponding volume data. The observed illiquidity ratio for a given non-trading probability is obtained 
from “observed” returns and volume data that stochastically include non-trading days, in proportion to the non-
trading probability, into the simulated data. The observed adjusted ratio (ILLIQ_A) is computed as ((2T-
τ)/2T)*ILLIQ, where T is the number of potential trading days and τ is the number of non-trading days within T. 
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Figure 4 
 
 
Figure 4: The probability of trading when the value of the absolute unobserved return exceeds the given number of 
standard deviations away from the mean unobserved return. The greater the standard deviation threshold, the less likely 
are absolute returns to exceed it, and the lower the inducement to trade. Unobserved returns are taken from 100,000 
simulated stock returns, with annualized expected return and standard deviation of 8 percent and 20 percent, 
respectively.  
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Figure 5 
 
 
Figure 5: The ratio of the observed adjusted illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ_A) for a stock (in the presence of thin trading) to the unobserved 
illiquidity ratio (when there is no thin trading) and the ratio of the observed unadjusted illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ) (in the presence of thin 
trading) to the unobserved illiquidity ratio (when there is no thin trading) are plotted against the probability of non-trading. The probability of 
non-trading depends upon the absolute value of the unobserved return as shown in Figure 4. The unobserved illiquidity ratio is the Amihud 
(2002) measure applied to 100,000 simulated stock returns, with annualized expected return and standard deviation of 8 percent and 20 
percent, respectively, and 100,000 corresponding volume data. The observed illiquidity ratio for a given non-trading probability is obtained 
from “observed” returns and volume data that include non-trading days that are determined by the magnitude of absolute returns. The 
observed adjusted ratio (ILLIQ_A) is computed as ((2T-τ)/2T)*ILLIQ, where T is the number of potential trading days and τ is the number of 
non-trading days within T. 
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Figure 6 
 
 
Figure 6: The distribution of changes in absolute returns before and after periods of non-trading (excluding non-trading periods 
starting on a Monday). Each sample point in the box plots is the proportional decrease in the annual average (across firms) absolute 
return averaged across the 10 (or 4) day window prior to a period of non-trading compared to the same measure across a similar length 
window following a period of non-trading.The plots measure decreases (increases) as positive (negative) values. The boxes show the 
median decreases, and the inter-quartile ranges (IQR), while the “whiskers” show the furthest points within 1.5 IQR of the outer 
quartiles. The single outlying observation is indicated by the diamond-shaped marker. 
  
-0.25
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
10 day window 4 day window
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
a
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
o
f
 
n
o
n
-
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
17 
 
 
Figure 7 
 
Figure 7: The ratio of the observed adjusted illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ_A) for a stock (in the presence of thin trading) to the unobserved illiquidity ratio (when there 
is no thin trading) and the ratio of the observed unadjusted illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ) (in the presence of thin trading) to the unobserved illiquidity ratio (when there 
is no thin trading) are plotted against the probability of non-trading. The probability of non-trading depends upon the absolute value of the unobserved return as 
shown in Figure 4. The unobserved illiquidity ratio is the Amihud (2002) measure applied to 100,000 simulated stock returns, with annualized expected return 
and unconditional standard deviation of 8 percent and 20 percent, respectively, and 100,000 corresponding volume data. The conditional variance of the returns 
follows an ARCH(1) process with an autoregressive parameter =0.90. The observed illiquidity ratio for a given non-trading probability is obtained from 
“observed” returns and volume data that include non-trading days that are determined by the magnitude of absolute returns, and where following periods of non-
trading, absolute returns drop by 15 percent and then have increasing volatility that reverts back to the 20 percent unconditional standard deviation after 10 
trading days. The observed adjusted ratio (ILLIQ_A) is computed as ((2T-τ)/2T)*ILLIQ, where T is the number of potential trading days and τ is the number of 
non-trading days within T. 
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Figure 8 
 
 
Figure 8: Estimated bias in the illiquidity premium of NYSE/AMEX stocks, using ILLIQMA as the illiquidity ratio. The risk premium is the product of 
the corresponding coefficient estimate on ILLIQMA in Tables 5, 7 and 8, and the average value of ILLIQMA. Estimates in columns labeled A, B, C 
and D use the data from the corresponding Panels in Tables 5, 7 and 8. In those tables, Panel A reports results of monthly returns regressed on the 
estimated market beta (βrm) and ILLIQMA. Panel B contains estimates where the cross-section model specification also includes βps the market-wide 
illiquidity risk factor, and the estimated betas on the Fama-French SMB (βSMB), HML (βHML) and Mom (βMom) factors. Panel C are the results from the 
specification that augments the regressions with market value (Size), book-to-market value (B/M), and the prior six month return, R(-6). Panel D 
extends the model further by including two alternative measures of liquidity, the Roll (1984) effective spread (Spread) and turnover (Turnover). The 
height of a lower bar is the estimate from using ILLIQMA, and the downward bias this has is the additional height in the upper portion (shaded) of a 
bar. 
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Figure 9 
 
 
Figure 9: Estimated bias in the illiquidity premium of NASDAQ stocks, using ILLIQMA as the illiquidity ratio. The risk premium is the product of the 
corresponding coefficient estimate on ILLIQMA in Tables 6, 9 and 10, and the average value of ILLIQMA. Estimates in columns labeled A, B, C and 
D use the data from the corresponding Panels in Tables 6, 9 and 10. In those tables, Panel A reports results of monthly returns regressed on the 
estimated market beta (βrm) and ILLIQMA. Panel B contains estimates where the cross-section model specification also includes βps the market-wide 
illiquidity risk factor, and the estimated betas on the Fama-French SMB (βSMB), HML (βHML) and Mom (βMom) factors. Panel C are the results from the 
specification that augments the regressions with market value (Size), book-to-market value (B/M), and the prior six month return, R(-6). Panel D 
extends the model further by including two alternative measures of liquidity, the Roll (1984) effective spread (Spread) and turnover (Turnover). The 
height of a lower bar is the estimate from using ILLIQMA, and the downward bias this has is the additional height in the upper portion (shaded) of a 
bar. 
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Highlights 
• We examine the effect of non-trading on the illiquidity ratio 
• Simulation analysis identifies an overstatement due to non-trading 
• We propose a simple correction for non-trading effects 
• The corrected measure is more closely related to transactions measures of illiquidity 
• Asset pricing tests capture the effects on estimated illiquidity and return premia  
 
